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It is outrageous that the Judge wants his profile redone because he
thinks it to be inaccurately harsh in portraying him in a poor light. It is
an understatement to characterize the Judge as "the worst judge in the
central district." It would be fairer to say he is ignorant, dishonest, illtempered, and a bully, and probably is one of the worst judges in the
United States. If television cameras ever were permitted in his courtroom,
the other federal judges in the Country would be so embarrassed by this
buffoon that they would run for cover. One might believe that some of the
reason for this sub-standard human is the recent acrimonious divorce
through which he recently went: but talking to attorneys who knew him
years ago indicates that, if anything, he has mellowed. One other comment: his girlfriend. . . . like the Judge, is a right-wing fanatic.
-

Stephen Yagman 1

L Introduction
Attorney Stephen Yagman wrote these scathing words about United
States District Court Judge William Keller.2 In addition, Yagman accused
Judge Keller of being anti-Semitic and "drunk on the bench" after Judge
Keller denied Yagman's motion and sanctioned him for bringing forth an
improper and frivolous claim.3 In a disciplinary proceeding, Standing
Committee on Disciplinev. Yagman,4 the United States District Court for
the Central District of California found that Yagman's statements impermissibly impugned the integrity of the court.5 The court concluded that

Yagman's statements constituted an ethical violation warranting a two-year
suspension from practicing law in the Central District of California.6 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
1. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 n.4 (9th Cir.
1995) (quoting Letter from Stephen Yagman to Prentice Hall, publisher of Almanac of the
FederalJudiciary(June 5, 1991)). The district court found that Yagman had mailed copies
of this letter to Prentice Hall and to Judge Keller. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1386 (C.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 n.4.
3. See id. at 1434 (finding that Yagman told Daily Journalreporter that Judge Keller
was "drunk on the bench," although Daily Journaldid not publish it, and that another paper
quoted Yagman as stating that Judge Keller "has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers
. . . [which is] evidence of anti-[S]emitism" (quoting Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions
Yagman: Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1991, at 1)).
4. 856 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
5. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. at 1399-1400 (determining that Yagman's accusation
impugning integrity of judiciary and interfering with random assignment of judges warranted
two-year suspension).
6. Id.
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court and struck down the suspension.7 The court of appeals concluded
that courts cannot sanction attorneys for making statements that degrade the
integrity of the judiciary unless the statements are capable of being proved
true or false.8 The Ninth Circuit's opinion is the first time in nearly fifteen
years that a federal appellate court has upheld an attorney's First Amend-

ment freedom of speech rights in the face of ethical speech restrictions. 9
In light of the Yagman opinion, this Note analyzes the constitutionality

of ethical rules that restrict attorneys' freedom of speech. Part II outlines
the relevant ethical rules that authorize sanctioning attorneys for speech that
might otherwise receive First Amendment protection. 10 Part II compares

the policy arguments that support the existing ethical rules restricting attorneys' freedom to criticize the judiciary with the policy rationale for condemning speech restrictions that infringe upon activity protected by the First
Amendment. 1 Part ITsummarizes the historical development of the restriction on attorney criticism of the judiciary.12 Part IV details the intricacies
of the Yagman decision.

3

Part V critiques the Yagman opinion in light of

the approaches taken in other cases that provided attorneys with less First
Amendment protection. 4 Part VI explores the parallel jurisprudence of
First Amendment rights in the contexts of the Hatch Act's restrictions on
federal employees 5 and universities' restrictions on student speech. 6 In

addition, Part VI examines whether policy concerns and existing jurispru7. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1445.
8. Id. at 1439-40.
9. See Richard C. Reuben, Lawyer Free Speech Upheld: 9th Circuit Overturns
Suspension for Maligning Judge, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 23 (reporting that legal ethics
expert Stephen Gillers believed Ninth Circuit opinion reversed modem trend by ruling in
favor of attorney free speech" rights).
10. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (describing California ethical rules
that restrict attorney speech impugning integrity of court or disrupting administration of
justice).
11. See infra notes 25-42 and accompanying text (presenting policies supporting and
opposing ethical rules restricting First Amendment rights of attorneys).
12. See infra notes 43-97 and accompanying text (summarizing historical development
of ethical rules and case law supporting limitations on attorney criticism of judiciary).
13. See infra notes 98-147 and accompanying text (describing facts, rationale, and
holding of Yagman).
14. See infra notes 148-62 and accompanying text (critiquing Yagman opinion and
comparing Ninth Circuit's rationale with traditional attorney criticism jurisprudence).
15. See infra notes 174-99 and accompanying text (describing Hatch Act's First
Amendment restrictions on federal employees that have withstood constitutional scrutiny).
16. See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text (exploring First Amendment difficulties in maintaining hate speech codes on university campuses).
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dence in the analogous contexts provide guidance for the attorney free
speech controversy.17 Finally, Part VII concludes that ethical codes can
constitutionally restrict attorney criticism of the judiciary because attorneys
accept a duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial system upon entering the
profession, and with that duty, certain necessary restraints attach."8
H1. Ethical Rules RestrictingAttorney Speech Versus
Attorneys' FirstAmendment Rights

The ethical rule at issue in the Yagman case, Local Rule 2.5.2 of the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, prohibits
conduct that "degrades or impugns the integrity of the Court or in any
manner interferes with the administration of justice therein." 9 Under Local
Rule 2.6.8 of the United States District Court for the Central District of

California, if a disciplinary panel finds that an attorney has violated this
rule of professional conduct, then sanctions attach ° despite the free speech

rights afforded by the First Amendment. 2 By sanctioning attorney speech
that degrades or impugns the integrity of the court, an ethical rule like the
one in the Yagman case can proscribe speech that would receive protection

under the First Amendment but for the speaker's profession.' Courts have
recognized that attorneys have diminished First Amendment rights under the
ethical rules that sanction otherwise protected speech. 23

The Yagman

17. See infra Parts VI.A.2, VI.B.3 (suggesting that persuasive principles from Hatch
Act and hate speech code cases lend assistance in resolving debate over attorney criticism
of judiciary).
18. See infra Part VII (arguing that ethical restrictions on attorney criticism are valid
despite fact that restrictions require attorneys to conform to higher code of conduct and to
forgo some liberties).
19.

LOCAL RULES OF THE U.S. DISTRCT CT. FOR THE CENTRAL DIsTRIcT OF CALIFOR-

NIA Rule 2.5.2 (1995), available in Westlaw, CA-Rules Database [hereinafter LOCAL

RULES].
20. See id. Rule 2.6.8 (authorizing imposition of sanctions if disciplinary body finds
attorney guilty of unprofessional conduct in violation of California Rules of Professional
Conduct).
21. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . .abridging the
freedom of speech . . ").

22. See In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385, 390, 393-94 (Mo. 1957) ("A layman may,
perhaps, pursue his theories of free speech... until he runs afoul of the penalties of libel
or slander, or into some infraction of our statutory law. A member of the bar can, and will,
be stopped at the point where he infringes our Canons of Ethics.").
23. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 636 (1959) (plurality opinion) (observing that
attorneys are subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which ordinary citizens are not
subject); David W. Wright, In Re Holtzman: Free Speech or ProfessionalMisconduct?, 9
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opinion, however, represents a departure from the traditional response
given by courts that, in certain contexts, attorneys do not possess First
Amendment rights equal to those of the ordinary citizen.'
The restrictions placed on attorney speech and the consequences for
violations of attorney speech regulations fuel the debate over which policy

arguments should prevail.' One of the purposes behind ethical rules
prohibiting conduct that degrades the integrity of the court is to minimize
unjust attorney criticism of judicial officers.' The drafters of ethical rules
that restrict attorney criticism of the judiciary neither intended nor desired
to protect judges from offensive or unsettling criticism, but intended to
preserve public faith and confidence in the fairness and impartiality of the

judicial system.' Courts repeatedly have endorsed ethical rules regulating
attorney criticism of the judiciary based on the rationale that allowing such
criticism to flourish would severely diminish the public's confidence in the

judiciary and thus hinder the efficient administration of justice.'

Although

TouRo L. REv. 587, 587 (1993) (noting that "[mlembership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions" (quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489
(N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.))); cf United States Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 866 (9th
Cir. 1993) (stating that although attorneys do not surrender freedom of expression, they
must temper criticisms in accordance with professional standards of conduct).
24. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (disbarring lawyer for
making false accusations against judge to members of jury and public officials); In re
Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Iowa 1976) (admonishing attorney for criticism of
court's decision and explaining that lawyers have fewer free speech rights than private
citizens); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Ky. 1980) (disciplining attorney for public statements about sitting judge); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500-01
(Nev. 1971) (reprimanding attorney for criticism of court's holding).
25. See infra notes 26-42 and accompanying text (articulating and comparing legitimate
competing policy concerns that exist on both sides of attorney criticism debate).
26. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871) (recognizing that valid
purpose behind sanctioning attorneys is need to limit offensive conduct and insulting
language about integrity of judiciary).
27. See Terry, 394 N.E.2d at 95 (declaring that drafters' intent was to promote
integrity of judicial system and not to shelter judges from unpleasant criticism).
28. See, e.g., In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that
attorney's letter to judge questioning judge's competence and impartiality, written during
pendency of appeal, amounted to attempt to prejudice administration of justice); In re
Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1973) (finding that attorney's statement that judge was
avoiding performance of his sworn duty was "calculated to cast a cloud of suspicion upon
the entire judiciary"); Terry, 394 N.E.2d at 96 ("Unwarranted public suggestion by an
attorney that a judicial officer is motivated by criminal purposes and considerations does
nothing but weaken and erode the public's confidence in an impartial adjudicatory process."); Committee on Prof 1 Ethics & Conduct v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129, 130 (Iowa
1980) ("To permit unfettered criticism regardless of the motive would tend to intimidate
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the courts have acknowledged that attorney criticism of the judiciary detrimentally affects the public's confidence in the legal system, some commentators have questioned whether an actual correlation exists between attorney

criticism of the judiciary and reduced public confidence in the judiciary.29
Another purpose of speech restrictions is to bolster the notion that the

legal profession is honorable, and thus, its members must conform to a
higher code of conduct to ensure the honor and integrity of the legal system. 0 Advocates of attorney speech restriction posit that upon entering the
legal profession, attorneys tacitly agree to abide by a higher code of conduct, including free speech limitations." Additionally, courts have stated
that attorneys are officers of the court who have voluntarily relinquished
certain rights as members of a regulated profession. 2 Others, however,
assert that attorneys do not relinquish their free speech rights when they
judges in the performance of their duties and would foster unwarranted criticism of our
courts."); Heleringer,602 S.W.2d at 168 (declaring that attorney's press conference statements that judge's behavior was unethical and grossly unfair tended to "bring the bench and
bar into disrepute and to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process").
29. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 11.3.2, at 601-02 (1986)
(finding "current that runs through some judicial opinions is that all lawyer criticism of judges
creates public disrespect for the law or the judiciary" and noting that courts' "self-solicitude
for the respect that lawyers owe judges entirely overlooks the fact that there is no provision
in the Code prohibiting lawyer disrespect for judges"); Jeanne D. Dodd, Comment, The First
Amendment and Attorney Disciplinefor Criticism of the Judiciary:Let the Lawyer Beware,
15 N. KY. L. REv. 129, 144 (1988) (positing that "silencing all attorney criticism is as likely
to generate suspicion as it is to promote confidence in the judicial system").
30. See ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2, Legal
Background, at 541 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter ANNOTATED MODEL RULES] (stating that one
justification for restrictions of attorney speech is necessity of maintaining public's confidence
in integrity of judiciary).
31. See id. (explaining another rationale for regulating attorney speech is that attorneys
"relinquish certain rights as members of a regulated profession and as officers of the court").
32. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985) (reasoning that "license
granted by the court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of justice"); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622,
646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "[o]bedience to ethical precepts may
require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected
speech"); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Iowa 1976) (recognizing that "lawyer, acting
in professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free speech than would a private
citizen"); In re Johnson, 729 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan. 1986) (finding that one purpose of
disciplinary action is to enforce "honorable conduct on the part of the court's own officers");
State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Neb. 1982) (proclaiming that "[a] lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and honor,
which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment of
justice").
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enter the profession, especially given the public's need for attorneys to
serve as the watchdog of the judiciary.33

First Amendment considerations compete with the policy rationales for
regulating attorney criticism of the judiciary.' By affirming decisions to
sanction attorneys for their criticism of judges, courts protect the ethical
justifications for the regulations and restrict attorneys' First Amendment
freedom of speech rights." The Supreme Court, however, has yet to
determine how to interpret ethical rules that restrict attorney criticism of the

judiciary in light of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.3

Added to the freedom of speech issue are the corollary interests of the

public's right to be informed about their legal system and the belief that
attorneys are best suited to provide such information.37 These two concerns
33. See WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 11.3.2, at 602-03 (refuting notion that lawyers
agree to less First Amendment protection and asserting necessity of attorney criticism of
judiciary). Professor Wolfram contends:
Any argument that lawyer criticism of judges is entitled to lesser protection than
nonlawyer criticism would have to proceed on the readily rejectable premise that
lawyers are not entitled to the normal rights of citizens or on the only slightly
stronger argument that there is a substantial and compelling state interest in
requiring lawyers to protect judges by never subjecting them to accurate criticism.
Certainly when the question before the public is whether a judge should be
retained in office in a judicial election, there should not be the slightest doubt that
lawyers are constitutionally entitled to debate the merits of a judicial candidacy as
vigorously as all other citizens.
Id.
34. See WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 11.3.2, at 602 (asserting that First Amendment
protection fully applies to attorneys and thus directly conflicts with hostility shown to lawyer
criticism of judges).
35. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (restricting attorney free
speech rights based on policy of protecting integrity of judiciary); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d
764, 767-69 (Iowa 1976) (same); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168-69
(Ky. 1980) (same); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Nev. 1971) (same).
36. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES, supra note 30, Rule 8.2, at 543 (noting that despite
First Amendment implications, Supreme Court has yet to evaluate ethical rules prohibiting
attorney criticism in light of First Amendment). The Annotated Model Rules of Professional
Conduct state that the Supreme Court has yet to determine the "fundamental constitutional
question of whether, and how, ethical constraints on lawyer criticism of judges and legal
officers are to be interpreted in light of the free speech guarantee." Id. Rule 8.2 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or
with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or
integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate
for election or appointment to judicial or legal office.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(a) (1983).
37. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Betrayingthe Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 28, 1976,
§ 7 (Book Review), at 1, 42-44 (discussing importance of upholding attorneys' freedom of
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drive the arguments against ethical regulations that impose strict regulations
on attorney speech."
Opponents of the regulation of attorney speech point to the First
Amendment guarantee of unrestricted, robust, and expansive debate on
public issues, no matter how vehement and caustic the speech may be.3 9
According to opponents of the restrictions, attorneys' freedom of speech
interests in criticizing the judiciary deserve additional respect because the
First Amendment's primary purposes are to ensure freedom of communication on subjects relating to government operations and to secure the public's
right of access to that information.' The opponents assert that the interests
in attorney freedom of speech rights and in the public's right to know are
paramount to the ethical considerations supporting the regulation of attorney
criticism of the judiciary.41 Accordingly, these opponents conclude that
speech guarantees and encouraging attorney evaluations of judges so that public is accurately
informed about flaws in judicial system). Dershowitz argues:
But, there is a high price paid in leaving to non-lawyers the major responsibility
for educating the lay public about the inadequacies of our courts. Practicing
lawyers who are daily exposed to the intricacies of the law have a unique
insider's understanding of the subtle relationships among the rules, institutions
and personalities that comprise our legal system. Many books by nonlawyers ...

sometimes fail to grasp these subtleties.

Id. at 43.
38. See id. (explaining that barring attorney criticism has created inherent tragedy by
misguiding public about adequacy of judiciary).
39. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (acknowledging
existence of "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials").
40. See Suzanne F. Day, Note, The Supreme Court'sAttack on Attorneys'Freedom
of Expression: The Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CAsE W. RES. L. REv.
1347, 1356 (1993) (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575
(1980)). For the position that criticism of the judiciary serves a vital purpose in the criminal
justice setting, see Nebraska PressAss'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("Commentary and reporting on the criminal justice system is at the core of
First Amendment values, for the operation and integrity of that system is of crucial import
to citizens concerned with the administration of government."). For authority supporting
the proposition that the public has a protected interest in receiving information about the
judiciary, see In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 809 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating
that variety of cases have demonstrated that individuals have right to receive information)
and LAWRENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CoNsTTUIoNAL LAW § 12-11, at 859 (2d ed. 1988)

(interpreting Richmond Newspapers as establishing public's right to information).
41. See Dershowitz, supra note 37, at 42-43 (asserting that freedom of speech rights
and public's need to know truth about judiciary's faults outweigh policies underlying ethical
rules restricting attorney criticism). For cases recognizing that the First Amendment
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attorneys should retain the full panoply of rights guaranteed to every
individual by the First Amendment. 42
includes the public's right to know or receive information generally, see Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762, 765 (1972) (considering right to receive information from
excluded alien); OrganizationFor A Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971)
(acknowledging right to distribute informational literature); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (evaluating right of viewers and listeners to obtain information
of public concern); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (recognizing right to read
or view obscene materials in privacy of one's home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-85 (1965) (establishing right to receive information about contraceptives and to use
contraceptives); Lamont v. PostmasterGen., 381 U.S. 301, 304 (1965) (recognizing right
to receive communist political propaganda); and Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,
142-43 (1943) (endorsing right to receive religious information).
For a detailed discussion of the right to know, see generally Edward J. Bloustein, The
FirstAmendment and Privacy: The Supreme CourtJustice and the Philosopher,28 RUTGERS
L. REV. 41 (1974); Robert J. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); William J. Brennan, Jr., Lecture, The Supreme Court and the
Meiklejohn Interpretationof the FirstAmendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965); Thomas I.
Emerson, Lecture, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1;
Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245; Bill
Aitchison, Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine:New Constitutional Considerations,63 GEO. LJ. 775 (1975); Frances L. Pergericht, Note, Attorneys'
Rights Under the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility: Free Speech, Right to Know, and
Freedom ofAssociation, 1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 687; and John M. Steel, Comment, Freedom
to Hear:A PoliticalJustificationof the FirstAmendment, 46 WASH. L. Rv. 311 (1971).
42. See Amici Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress-Pacific Southwest
Region, Article 19, and Individual Law Professors and Attorneys in Support of RespondentAppellant at 2, Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-55918) (asserting that First Amendment rights of attorneys create immovable barrier
to imposition of sanctions for speech violations of ethical rules, particularly in light of public
capacity of judges). The authors of the brief argued:
The First Amendment stands as an insurmountableobstacle to the imposition of
sanctions against an attorney for "impugning the integrity" of the Court by public
criticism, even intemperate criticism, of judges. Federal court judges are public
officials whose performance and public integrity must be open to challenge, like
every other public official in our democratic system. If attorneys believe that
sitting judges are anti-Semitic or dishonest, they are free to say so publicly. This
is so even if it turns out that they are wrong and even if it is painful to the judge
involved.

[Ain attorney should never be punished simply for impugning the integrity
of a particular judge, a court or the legal system as a whole.
Such threats to the "integrity" of public officials and institutions may not
be purchased at the expense of freedom of expression in our constitutional
system.
Id. at 2, 6, 23 (emphasis added). The views of this amici curiae brief represent the position
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III. The HistoricalFoundation of Restrictions on
Attorney Criticism of the Judiciary

Traditionally, courts have interpreted the American Bar Association
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (Code) as imposing significant restrictions on attorney criticism of the judiciary.4 3 The basis for the courts'
holdings stems from one of two assumptions: (1) attorney criticism of the
judiciary is likely to diminish public confidence in the legal system; or
(2) attorneys sacrifice certain rights in exchange for their elevated status as
members of a regulated profession.'M The majority of courts have rejected
held by the array of Yagman supporters. Id. app. A. Participants included the American
Jewish Congress and Article 19, an international, nongovernmental organization. Id. at 2-3.
The American Jewish Congress actively fights to protect religious, civil, political, and
economic rights of Jewish people and to promote First Amendment liberties as enshrined
in the Constitution. Id. In addition, over seventy individual lawyers and law professors
contributed to Yagrnan's legal battle against censorship by providing a uniform front against
the chilling effect of imposing ethical sanctions for speech critical of the judiciary. Id. at
2-3, app. A. Erwin Chemerinsky and Susan R. Estrich were among the many distinguished
individuals who supported Yagman's position. Id. app. A; see also Amicus CuriaeBrief of
the Los Angeles Chapter of National Lawyers Guild at 1, Standing Comm. on Discipline
v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-55918) (declaring that imposition of
sanctions poses massive risk of chilling attorney's exercise of First Amendment rights). In
its brief, the National Lawyer's Guild proclaims:
To the extent that such rules of procedure authorize the punishment of attorneys
for conduct, particularly verbal conduct ... such rules should be construed and
applied most strictly in favor of the lawyers and against the right to inflict punishment. These rules should favor the minimization of punishment in those cases
where any punishment at all is justified.
This is so especially in the case where the First Amendment rights of the
lawyer are involved. Any process which has the effect of causing lawyers to be
fearful in connection with their exercise of First Amendment rights must be
avoided to the maximum extent possible. The failure to follow these principles
is likely to have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights by
the attorney particularly where he is criticizing the courts or one of its members.
Id.
43. See Sandra M. Molley, Note, Restrictionson Attorney Criticismof the Judiciary:
A Denial of FirstAmendment Rights, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 489, 489-90 (1981) (explaining
how courts have traditionally interpreted Code as restricting all attorney criticism); see also
In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 687-90 (Fla. 1973) (interpreting and applying ethical rule to
sanction attorney for criticism of judiciary); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979)
(same); In re Friedland, 376 N.E.2d 1126, 1127-28 (Ind. 1978) (same); In re Frerichs, 238
N.W.2d 764, 768-70 (Iowa 1976) (same); State v. Russell, 610 P.2d 1122, 1127-28 (Kan.
1980) (same); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 499-501 (Nev. 1971) (same); In re Lacey, 283
N.W.2d 250, 251-53 (S.D. 1979) (same).
44. See Molley, supra note 43, at 489-90 (explaining two justifications for courts'
imposition of sanctions on attorneys for criticism of judiciary).
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First Amendment arguments and have upheld restrictions on attorney
criticism because of the strong state interest in preserving the integrity of
the judiciary and the legal system generally.45
In the 1871 case of Bradley v. Fisher,' the Supreme Court proclaimed
that lawyers have an obligation to refrain from making statements attacking
the integrity of the judiciary.47 The Bradley decision influenced states'
early efforts to codify ethical restrictions on attorney speech.' By 1908,
the American Bar Association (ABA) released the Canons of Professional

Responsibility (Canons), which set forth aspirational goals designed to
advance the legal profession and to preserve its dignity.4 9 Because the ABA
45. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (sanctioning lawyer
criticism of court's opinion); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Iowa 1976) (admonishing attorney for criticism of court's decision); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602
S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Ky. 1980) (disciplining attorney for statements made in public about
judiciary); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Nev. 1971) (reprimanding attorney for
criticism of court's holding); see also Molley, supranote 43, at 490 (discussing how courts
have imposed numerous harsh sanctions, including public reprimand, suspension, and
disbarring based on determination that free speech concerns do not outweigh state's interest
in defending its public officials).
46. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
47. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 356 (1871) (finding that attorney's
threatening judge with personal chastisement was sufficient grounds for striking name of
attorney from court's rolls of practicing attorneys in that court). In Bradley, the Supreme
Court considered the extent of an attorney's obligation to abstain from impugning the
integrity of the judiciary and the court's ability to sanction attorneys for such attacks. Id.
at 355. According to the Bradley Court, attorneys have a duty to maintain a level of respect
toward the judicial system and its officers at all times. Id. The Supreme Court emphasized
that attorneys have an obligation to refrain from making insulting statements about the
judiciary both in and out of court. Id. In conclusion, the Bradley Court stated that an
attorney's threatening personal chastisement of a judge, out of court but during the pendency
of trial, warranted the striking of the attorney's name from the rolls of lawyers practicing
in the court. Id. at 356.
For a critique of the Bradley decision, see Molley, supra note 43, at 491. Molley
asserts:
The Bradley decision was inadequate because it failed to (1) define the boundary
lines of the ethical standards it sought to maintain, (2) consider the effects of a
strict application of these disciplinary regulations on attorneys' first amendment
rights, and (3) recognize that a certain amount of criticism of the judiciary would
help to maintain the viability of the legal system.
Id. (citing Note, Attorney Discfline and the FirstAmendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922, 924
(1974)).
48. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 132-35 (discussing impact of Bradley conclusion that
attorneys should refrain from criticizing judiciary).
49. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 1 (1908) (setting forth
aspirational goals to uplift legal profession and ensure its integrity).

54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 (199?)
believed that a correlation existed between maintaining the integrity of the
legal profession and restricting attorney criticism of the judiciary, the
Canons instructed attorneys to foster an attitude of respect for the judiciary
as acknowledgment of the judicial system's supreme importance.s In
addition, the Canons expected attorneys to further the propriety and the
honor of the legal system. 5 Although the Canons allowed justifiable
criticism of the judiciary if directed through the appropriate channels within
the ABA, 52 the expansive language of the Canons impliedly prohibited any
attorney criticism with the potential to injure the image of the judiciary or
the legal profession generally. 3
Most judicial decisions interpreting the Canons prohibited attorney
criticism of the judiciary altogether, regardless of whether the criticism had
any real potential to injure the image of the profession? 4 Most courts
rendered opinions barring attorney criticism of the judiciary without consid50. See id. (demanding that attorneys show utmost respect for judiciary due to its paramount importance). Canon 1 states:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. Judges, not being wholly free to defend
themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the Bar against unjust
criticism and clamor.
Id.
51. See id. (describing attorneys' duty to maintain and improve propriety and honor
of legal system).
52. See id. (explaining that attorneys should submit serious complaints about judiciary
to proper authorities).
53. See id. (implicitly barring any unjust attorney statements that could injure perception of integrity of legal profession); see also Molley, supra note 43, at 491 (claiming that
although Canons purported to allow attorney criticism of judiciary, broad language of
Canons created room for interpretation restricting attorney criticism that was potentially
harmful to profession's image).

54. See Florida Bar v. Stokes, 186 So. 2d 499, 499 (Fla. 1966) (neglecting to consider
seriously impact of disparaging remarks on judicial system yet still sanctioning attorney for
making such remarks); State e reL Fla. Bar v. Edwards, 102 So. 2d 610, 610 (Fla. 1958)
(same); State ex reL Fla. Bar v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608-09 (Fla. 1958) (same); In
re Glenn, 130 N.W.2d 672, 675-76 (Iowa 1964) (same); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v.
Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321, 325-26 (Ky. 1955) (same); In re Lord, 97 N.W.2d 287, 294-95
(Minn. 1959) (same); State ex reL Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Nielsen, 136 N.W.2d 355, 35960 (Neb. 1965) (same); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes, 131 N.W.2d 118,
127-28 (Neb. 1964) (same); State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 231 (N.J. 1968) (same);
State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (N.J. 1964) (same); In re Greenfield, 262
N.Y.S.2d 349, 350-51 (App. Div. 1965) (same); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Bednarczuk, 258
N.E.2d 116, 117 (Ohio 1970) (same); In re Gorsuch, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648-50 (S.D. 1965)
(same); In re Simmons, 395 P.2d 1013, 1019 (Wash. 1964) (same).
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ering the First Amendment issue.' Other courts explicitly rejected First
Amendment arguments on the basis that voluntary entrance into the bar
signified relinquishment of any First Amendment right to criticize the
judiciary beyond the channels provided by the ABA.56 Still other courts
considered the First Amendment issue, but concluded that the state interest
in upholding the public's respect for the judiciary outweighed attorneys'
First Amendment freedom of speech rightsY
In 1959, the Supreme Court re-examined the traditional approach of
restraining attorney criticism of the judiciary in In re Sawyer. 8 In Sawyer,
the Supreme Court considered whether the evidence supported a lower
court's conclusion that defense counsel's speech impugned the impartiality
and fairness of the federal district court judge conducting the ongoing trial
and frustrated the administration of justice by damaging the integrity of the
court.5 9 Harriet Sawyer acted as defense counsel in the trial of several
defendants charged with conspiracy under the Smith Act." A disciplinary
body brought charges against Sawyer for statements made at a village
meeting in Hawaii concerning the presiding United States District Court
Judge six weeks after the initiation of the trial.61 According to the charges,
Sawyer claimed that a fair trial under the Smith Act was impossible, in part
because presiding judges completely ignored the rules of evidence in order
to assist the state in building its case.' In addition, Sawyer stated that
horrible and shocking events occurred in the courtroom during a Smith Act
conspiracy trial, including the Government's instructing witnesses to make
55. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 134 (discussing historical trend of courts regarding
attorney criticism and level of consideration or neglect given to First Amendment issues);

Note, Attorney Discoline and the FirstAmendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922, 924 (describing extent to which courts ignored First Amendment issue in attorney criticism cases).
56. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 134-35 (noting that Bradley Court rejected First

Amendment arguments because of belief that attorneys voluntarily sacrifice full First
Amendment protection upon entrance into legal profession); Note, supra note 55, at 924-25
(same).
57. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 134-35 (explaining that courts which considered First
Amendment issue concluded that state's interest in ensuring integrity of legal profession

outweighed any First Amendment infringement); Note, supra note 55, at 924-25 (same).
58.

360 U.S. 622 (1959) (plurality opinion).

59. In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 626 (1959) (plurality opinion). The ABA Ethics
Committee concluded that defense counsel's statements attacking the judiciary violated
Canon 1, The Duty of the Lawyer to the Courts, and Canon 22, Candor and Fairness, of
the ABA Canons of ProfessionalEthics. Id. at 625-26 (plurality opinion).

60. Id. at 623 (plurality opinion).
61.

Id. (plurality opinion).

62. Id. at 628-29 (plurality opinion).
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statements in order to convict the defendant.63 Beyond the general attacks
on the judicial system, the government generally, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation particularly, Sawyer also made impugning statements about
the ongoing Smith Act trial.' The ABA Ethics Committee found that
Sawyer's public remarks attacked the presiding judge's impartiality and
fairness while also degrading the court's judicial integrity.' The ABA
Ethics Committee concluded that Sawyer's speech violated the Canons, and
the territorial supreme court found that the violation warranted suspension
from the practice of law for one year.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the sanction.67
Justice Brennan, for the plurality,6 determined that the evidence failed
to support the finding that Sawyer's speech attacked the judge's impartiality
or that it impugned the integrity of the court.69 Justice Brennan found that
Sawyer's statements criticized the system of laws relating to the Smith Act,
rather than the enforcers of such laws.70 The plurality opinion concluded
that Sawyer's statements never crossed the line of impermissibility' because
the statements only attacked the state of the law and the judge's interpretation of the law.' According to Justice Brennan, both types of statements
were protected forms of speech despite the facts that the speaker was an
attorney and that the attorney made the statements out of court during the
pendency of the trial. 3 Because of the lack of proof that any of the statements tended to obstruct justice in the ongoing trial,7 Justice Brennan found
629-30
630-31
624-25
623-25

(plurality opinion).
(plurality opinion).
(plurality opinion).
(plurality opinion).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

67.
68.

In re Sawyer, 260 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
Sawyer, 360 U.S. at 623-46 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court Justices filed

three separate opinions in Sawyer. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Black and Douglas, authored the plurality opinion. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice
Frankfurter, joined by Justice Clark, Justice Harlan, and Justice Whitaker, wrote the

dissenting opinion. Id. at 647-69 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart filed a
separate opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 636 (plurality opinion).
70. Id. at 632 (plurality opinion).
71. Id. at 636 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan noted that Sawyer did not state that
the judge was "corrupt or venal or stupid or incompetent." Id. at 635 (plurality opinion).
72. Id. at 631-33 (plurality opinion). Defining the boundary of permissible attorney
speech, Justice Brennan asserted that public statements attributing error in legal judgment

to the judiciary are not a basis for disciplinary action. Id. at 635 (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 636 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan concluded that the statements lacked any
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that the First Amendment protected Sawyer's statements and, therefore,
lifted the suspension order.7'
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart focused on the special duties
of those who choose to join the legal profession.76 Although he concluded

that the speech was not punishable based on its content, Justice Stewart
strongly asserted that an attorney's obligation to the legal profession outweighs the attorney's First Amendment rights when a conflict between the
two arises.' The dissent, led by Justice Frankfurter and joined by three
other justices, further endorsed the principle that attorneys surrender some

First Amendment liberties upon admission into the profession. 71 Inaccordance with this belief that attorneys assume a heightened duty to uphold the
court's integrity, the dissent urged that Sawyer's statements represented a
fierce attack upon the court, well deserving of discipline.79

Two theories on the propriety of restrictions on attorney speech crystallized in the Sawyer opinion. The plurality focused on the First Amendment rights that attorneys retain, specifically the right to criticize a body of
law and the judicial interpretations of that law.'

The dissent argued that

attorneys must remain within certain ethical boundaries to preserve the
integrity of the profession."1 Because society entrusts attorneys with the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the integrity of the legal system,
tendency to obstruct justice because the statements were not likely to reach the judge or the
jury. Id. (plurality opinion). The possibility of the statements disrupting the administration
of justice, therefore, was too slim to be sanctionable. Id. (plurality opinion). On the other
hand, Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent, argued that the type of criticism Sawyer made
deserved no constitutional protection regardless of the likelihood that the statements would
reach either the judge or the jury. Id. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 636 (plurality opinion).
76. Id. at 646-47 (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring). In his separate concurrence, Justice Stewart
asserted: "Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech. For example, I doubt that a physician
who broadcast[s] the confidential disclosures of his patients could rely on the constitutional
right of free speech to protect him from professional discipline." Id. (Stewart, J., concur-

ring).
78. Id. at 668 (Frankfirer, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Frankfurter proclaimed
that an attorney "isnot merely another citizen. He is an intimate and trusted and essential
part of the machinery of justice, an 'officer of the court' in the most compelling sense."
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 669 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 631-32 (plurality opinion) (acknowledging First Amendment rights that
attorneys retain, such as right to criticize state of law and judicial interpretation of law).
81. See id. at 668 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (asserting necessity of restraining forms
of attorney criticism that are permissible to maintain integrity and honor of legal profession).
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when an attorney betrays such duties, as Sawyer did, sanctions should

flow. ' Although Justice Brennan's plurality opinion applied an effectsbased test, which required finding a tendency to obstruct justice,' Justice

Frankfurter's dissent and Justice Stewart's concurrence emphasized the
potential harm that could result if courts began to stray from the traditional

standards established in Bradley and reaffirmed in the Canons. 4 Following
Sawyer, many lower courts continued to apply those traditional principles.'
Thus, these lower courts continued to affirm severe sanctions imposed on

attorneys for criticizing the judiciary,86 despite Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion in Sawyer.
In an attempt to clarify the guidelines governing attorney criticism of
the judiciary, the ABA recast the scope of limitations on attorney criticism
in the 1969 Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and then again in 1980.1

The 1980 version of the Code holds attorneys to a higher standard of
82. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 636 (plurality opinion) (advocating effects test that asks whether critical
statements have tendency to obstruct justice).
concurring) (warning of detrimental effects that might
84. See id. at 646 (Stewart, J.,
result if Supreme Court strays from traditional standards of Canons); id. at 668 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (echoing Justice Stewart's concern that departing from traditional approach
of in-court criticism might cause negative consequences).
85. See Molley, supra note 43, at 494 (explaining that many courts persisted in their
application of principles enunciated in Bradley and in Canons). Molley states: "Instead of
applying the 'tend to obstruct' test of the plurality opinion in Sawyer, most courts have
continued to apply the traditional standards established in Bradley and reiterated in the
Canons and the Frankfurter dissent in Sawyer." Id.
86. See, e.g., In re Whiteside, 386 F.2d 805, 806 (2d Cir. 1967) (upholding sanctions
imposed on attorney for critical statements attacking judiciary); In re Belli, 371 F. Supp.
111, 112-14 (D.D.C. 1974) (same); Spencer v. Dixon, 290 F. Supp. 531, 537-40 (W.D.
La. 1968) (same); Florida Bar v. Stokes, 186 So. 2d 499, 499 (Fla. 1966) (same); In re
Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (same); In re Friedland, 376 N.E.2d 1126, 112728 (Ind. 1978) (same); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768-70 (Iowa 1976) (same); In re
Glenn, 130 N.W.2d 672, 675-76, 678 (Iowa 1964) (same); State v. Russell, 610 P.2d 1122,
1127-28 (Kan. 1980) (same); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168-69
(Ky. 1980) (same); State ex rel. Neb. Bar Ass'n v. Rhodes, 131 N.W.2d 118, 127-28 (Neb.
1964) (same); In re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 499-501 (Nev. 1971) (same); State v. Kavanaugh, 243 A.2d 225, 231 (N.J. 1968) (same); State v. Van Duyne, 204 A.2d 841, 852
(N.J. 1964) (same); In re Meeker, 414 P.2d 862, 863-70 (N.M. 1966) (same); In re
Greenfield, 262 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350-51 (App. Div. 1965) (same); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v.
Bednarczuk, 258 N.E.2d 116, 117 (Ohio 1970) (same); In re Simmons, 395 P.2d 1013,
1019 (Wash. 1964) (same).
87. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) (restructuring restrictions
on attorneys for critical statements about judiciary). For an in-depth description of the
Model Code's contents, see Dodd, supra note 29, at 138-39.
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conduct than the average citizen.'

It includes Ethical Considerations that

encourage attorneys to exercise their First Amendment rights to evaluate the
legal system critically because attorneys are uniquely qualified to evaluate
the deficiencies in the judicial system. 9 The Ethical Considerations specifi-

cally state that attorneys have a heightened level of responsibility to offer
commentary about the judiciary.9' Thus, in some respects, the language of
the Code concerning attorney criticism provides some level of protection for
attorney free speech rights.9' The Disciplinary Rules, however, restrict the
extent to which an attorney can criticize the judiciary.

2

For example, the

Disciplinary Rules forbid attorneys to knowingly make false statements of
fact and false accusations or to prejudicially interfere with the administration of justice. 3 Thus, the Disciplinary Rules present the possibility of
sanctions for attorneys who violate the ethical rules, which could dissuade
attorneys from fully exercising their free speech rights and could deprive

the public of information about the quality of judicial officials.

4

88. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preamble at 1 (1980) (describing attorneys' role as guardians of law which includes obligations to uphold highest
standards of ethical conduct).
89. See id. EC 8-1 (encouraging attorneys to make constant efforts to enhance legal
system and command public respect for legal system). The ABA has stated that the "Ethical
Canons are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every
member of the profession should strive." Id. prelim. statement at 2.
90. See id. EC 8-6 (stating that attorneys have special obligations to ensure that judges
meet qualification standards). The Ethical Consideration adds that although attorneys have
the right to criticize such officials publicly, an attorney "should be certain of the merit of
his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and
intemperate statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system." Id.
91. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 140 (stating that on its face, Disciplinary Rule
language prohibiting knowingly making false accusations provides enhanced protection to
attorneys in disciplinary proceedings in comparison to subjective knowing or reckless
disregard standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
92. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-102 (1980) (instructing
that attorney shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning qualifications of
judicial candidate and attorney shall not knowingly make false accusations against judiciary).
93. Id. DR 1-102(A)(5) & DR 8-102. DR 1-102(A)(5) states: "A lawyer shall not:
Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice." Id. DR 1-102(A)(5).
DR 8-102 states: "(A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial office. [or] (B)
A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory
officer." Id. DR 8-102.
94. See Molley, supra note 43, at 495 (asserting that uncertainty and mere threat of
sanctions not only stifles attorneys' free speech, but also deprives public of access to
information about actions and quality of judicial officers).
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In 1983, the ABA adopted the Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct,

attempting to strike a balance between ensuring litigants' rights to fair trials
and protecting attorney free speech rightsY Rule 8.2 addresses attorney
criticism of the judiciary and attempts to provide broader First Amendment
protections to attorneys than did previous rules.' Subsequently, the Supreme Court again confronted the issue of attorney criticism of the judiciary, but refused to address the constitutional issues.'
IV. Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman
In Yagman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered whether Yagman's public statements violated local ethical
restrictions on attorney criticism of the judiciary.9" In 1991, Yagman filed
a pro se lawsuit against several insurance companies" and sought to disqualify Judge Manuel Real on the basis of bias."° Judge William Keller

heard the motion to disqualify, denied the motion, 101 and sanctioned
Yagman for bringing an improper and frivolous matter.'1 2 Yagman reacted
to Judge Keller's denial and sanction by launching a series of verbal and
written attacks regarding Judge Keller's personal characteristics and professional qualifications. 1t
95. See Dodd, supra note 29, at 141 (describing ABA's efforts to accommodate competing interests of public and of attorneys).
96. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2 (1983) (stating that
attorney shall not make statement with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard as
to its truth or falsity concerning qualifications or integrity of judiciary).
97. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1985) (declining to evaluate constitutional
issues considered to be unnecessary to disposition of case).
98. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1436 (9th Cir. 1995).
99. Id. at 1433.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1434 (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 136 F.R.D. 652, 657-58 (C.D. Cal.

1991)).
102. Id. (citing Yagman v. Republic Ins., 137 F.R.D. 310, 312 (C.D. Cal. 1991)).
Judge Keller reprimanded Yagman harshly. Id. (citing Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at 318-19).
The sanction order stated that "neither monetary sanctions nor suspension appear to be
effective in deterring Yagman's pestiferous conduct." Id. (citing Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at
318). The order further recommended that Yagman be "disciplined appropriately" by the
California State Bar. Id. (citing Yagman, 137 F.R.D. at 319). On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Yagman's recusal motion, but reversed
the sanctions. Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 643 (9th Cir. 1993).
103. See Yagnan, 55 F.3d at 1434 (describing Yagman's numerous critical attacks of
Judge Keller in retaliation for Judge Keller's sanction order); see also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (same).
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Less than a week after Judge Keller's sanction order, the press quoted
Yagman as accusing Judge Keller of anti-Semitism."4 In an unpublished
statement, the press recorded Yagman as saying that Judge Keller was
"drunk on the bench.""Ies In response to a request from Prentice Hall, the

publisher of the Almanac of the Federal Judiciary,"° Yagman sent an
inflammatory letter criticizing Judge Keller's actions as a judge and as an

individual."° In addition, Yagman placed an advertisement in the Los
Angeles Daily Journal requesting attorneys sanctioned by Judge Keller to
contact Yagman's law office. 08 Ultimately, Yagman informed another
attorney, Robert Steinberg, that he hoped his public, critical attacks would
force Judge Keller to recuse himself in future cases." ° Because Steinberg

104. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 (detailing statements Yagman made to members of
press). The court noted that the press quoted Yagman's statement that Judge Keller "has
a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David Kenner and Hugh Manes. I find this
to be evidence of anti-[S]emitism." Id. (quoting Susan Seager, Judge Sanctions Yagman:
Refers Case to State Bar, L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1991, at 1).
105. See id. (citing Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384,
1386 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
106. See id. (discussing Almanac of Federal Judiciary'spurpose and its request for
comments concerning judges). The Ninth Circuit explained the common perception of the
Almanac of the FederalJudiciary as a "much-fretted-about" publication. Id. The court
described the Almanac as
a loose-leaf service consisting of profiles of federal judges. Each profile covers
the judge's educational and professional background, noteworthy rulings, and
anecdotal items of interest. One section - which many judges pretend to ignore
but in fact read assiduously - is styled "Lawyers' Evaluation." Perhaps because
the comments are published anonymously, they sometimes contain criticism more
pungent than judges are accustomed to. Judges who believe the comments do not
fairly portray their performance occasionally ask Prentice Hall to seek additional
comments; Prentice Hall's letter to Yagman was sent pursuant to such a request.
Id. at 1434 n.3.
107. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing critical letter Yagman sent to
Almanac of FederalJudiciary regarding Judge Keller).
108. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1434 (describing advertisement that Yagman placed in
newspaper soliciting comments from other attorneys sanctioned by Judge Keller). According
to the court, the full text of the advertisement read: "This office is gathering evidence
concerning sanctions imposed by U.S. Dist. Judge William D. Keller. It would be appreciated if any attorney who has been sanctioned, or threatened with sanctions, by Judge Keller
fill out the form below and mail it to us. Thank you." Id. at 1434 n.5.
109. See id. at 1434 (describing Yagman's comments to another attorney, including
statement of Yagman's desire to force Judge Keller's recusal). Although Yagman vehemently denied making any statements to Steinberg, the district court heard testimony from
both sides and ultimately believed Steinberg's version. Id. at 1434 n.6 (citing Yagman, 856
F. Supp. at 1392).
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believed that Yagman's actions constituted misconduct, Steinberg reported
his conversation with Yagman in a letter to the Standing Committee on
Discipline of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California (Standing Committee).110 Shortly thereafter, the Standing Com-

mittee received a letter from Judge Keller detailing the full extent of Yagman's critical comments."'
Prior to a hearing before three Central District judges, Yagman raised
First Amendment arguments against the imposition of any sanctions based
on his critical statements about Judge Keller." 2 Despite the complexity of
the free speech issues, the district court disregarded the requests of both
parties to brief the issues. 3 After a two-day hearing, the district court
found that Yagman had committed misconduct by impugning the integrity
of the court and by interfering with the administration of justice by judgeshopping. 4 Accordingly, the district court suspended Yagman from
practice in the Central District of California for two years.115
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first disposed of Yagman's due process
claim, which Yagman based on alleged conflicts of interest by the three district court judges. 1 6 Then, the court of appeals considered the propriety of
110. See id. at 1434 (explaining that Steinberg reported Yagman's critical statements
and questionable intentions to disciplinary committee).
111. See id. at 1435 (noting that Judge Keller sent disciplinary committee Yagman's
letter containing criticisms of Judge Keller). The court described Judge Keller's letter to
the Standing Committee:
Judge Keller stated that "Mr. Yagman's campaign of harassment and intimidation
challenges the integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, there is clear evidence that
Mr. Yagman's attacks upon me are motivated by his desire to create a basis for
recusing me in any future proceeding." Judge Keller suggested: "The Standing Committee on Discipline should take action to protect the Court from further abuse."
Id. (quoting letter of Judge William Keller to Standing Committee on Discipline) (citations
omitted).
112. See id. (explaining that Yagman raised First Amendment arguments against imposition of sanctions in district court).
113. See id. (describing how district court ignored requests to brief First Amendment
issues despite difficulty of such issues).
114. See id. (citing Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1395,
1400 (C.D. Cal. 1994)).
115. Id.
116. See id. at 1435-36 (dismissing Yagman's due process claim due to lack of support
for assertion that district court judges had conflict of interest). The court stated: "Nor do
we find any other support for Yagman's due process claim ....

So long as the judges

hearing the misconduct charges are not biased (and Yagman doesn't claim they are), there
is no legitimate cause for concern over the composition and partiality of the Standing
Committee." Id. at 1436.
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the sanctions against Yagman under two separate prohibitions of Local Rule

2.5.2 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.I 7 One prong of Local Rule 2.5.2 prohibits impugning the integrity of
the court, and the other prong forbids interfering with the administration of

justice."' The Ninth Circuit considered the two provisions separately
because different First Amendment standards apply to each. n 9
First, the court of appeals analyzed the provision banning attorney
activity that degrades the integrity of the court." Although the district
court found the provision to be overbroad,121 the court saved the provision
with a limiting construction: the district court read into the provision an
objective version of the malice standard introduced in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan."

Applying the rationale of United States District Court v.

117. Id.; see LOCAL RULES, supra note 19, Rule 2.5.2 (prohibiting statements that
impugn integrity of court or interfere with administration of justice).
118. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1436 (describing interrelation of two prongs of Local
Rule, one of which prohibits impugning integrity of court and other of which bars interfering with administration of justice).
119. See id. at 1436-45 (considering two prongs of ethical rule separately due to different standards needed to evaluate violations under each prong).
120. Id. at 1436.
121. Id. at 1436-37. The court noted: "As the district court recognized, this provision
is overbroad because it purports to punish a great deal of constitutionally protected speech,
including all true statements reflecting adversely on the reputation or character of federal
judges." Id.
122. Id. at 1437. Describing the limiting construction crafted by the district court, the
Ninth Circuit stated:
To save the "impugn the integrity" portion of Rule 2.5.2, the district court read into
it an "objective" version of the malice standard enunciated in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan. Relying on United States District Court v. Sandlin, ...

,

the court

limited Rule 2.5.2 to prohibit only false statements made with either knowledge of
their falsity or with reckless disregard as to their truth or falsity, judged from the
standpoint of a "reasonable attorney."
Id. (citations omitted).
123. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (concluding that,
in defamation suits, courts must apply subjective malice standard to particular individual that
made statements at issue). In New York Times, the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which the First Amendment limits state power to award a public official damages for a
defamatory statement relating to the official's conduct. Id. at 256. Sullivan, who was the
Commissioner of the City of Montgomery, Alabama and the supervisor of the police department, sued the New York Times Company for defamation based on a published advertisement that included several false charges of repressive police conduct in Montgomery. Id.
at 256-58 & app. Although the New York Times advertisement did not mention Sullivan,
the language of the article implicated Sullivan indirectly. Id. Under the controlling state
libel per se law, once Sullivan demonstrated that the New York Times advertisement reflected
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Sandlin,A the district court limited Local Rule 2.5.2 to forbid only false

statements made either with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless
disregard as to their truth or falsity as determined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable attorney." z Under the Sandlin standard, attorneys may freely
upon the agency Sullivan supervised, the only defense was truth, and thus, the New York
Times lost. Id. at 267. The Supreme Court recognized the Constitution's profound commitment to uninhibited debate on public issues. Id. at 270. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the deterrent effect of damage awards was so great that it severely chilled criticism of
public officials, which is speech protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 277-79. The
Court, however, concluded that a public official could recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to official conduct if she could prove that the author made the statement
with actual malice, that is, the author possessed knowledge of the statement's falsity or acted
with a reckless disregard of the truth. Id. at 279-80. Because Sullivan's proof was
insufficient to show actual malice, the Supreme ultimately reversed in favor of New York
Times Company. Id. at 285-92.
124. United States Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993) (determining that attorney disciplinary proceedings for ethical violations warrant objective standard,
rather than subjective defamation standard). In Sandlin, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit consider& whether to modify the New York Times malice standard for
attorney disciplinary proceedings. Id. Attorney Sandlin wrongfully accused a district judge
of instructing his court reporter to change the transcript of the court proceedings. Id. Even
though the judge agreed to allow a deposition of the reporter, Sandlin failed to wait for the
results of the deposition before making an accusation against the judge. Id. Disciplinary
proceedings ensued against Sandlin pursuant to Washington Rule of Professional Conduct
8.2(a), which stated in part: "A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows
to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications,
integrity, or record of a judge . . . ." Id. at 864. Sandlin raised a First Amendment
challenge to Rule 8.2. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit noted that the language of the ethical
rule closely paralleled the New York Times malice standard, the court found that the wholly
subjective standard applicable in defamation cases was not suited to attorney disciplinary
proceedings. Id. at 867. According to the Ninth Circuit, an objective standard governs in
attorney disciplinary proceedings. Id. The objective standard requires the court to determine what a reasonable attorney would do in the same or similar circumstances. Id. The
court of appeals reasoned that there are substantial distinctions between the interests served
by defamation law and the interests served by rules of professional ethics. Id. Applying
the objective standard, the court of appeals concluded that Sandlin lacked a reasonable
factual basis for his accusation by failing to utilize readily accessible means of verifying his
accusation of criminal conduct by the judge. Id. at 867-68.
125. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1386-90 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (discussing objective knowledge and reckless disregard standard from Sandlin).
According to the Yagman court, the Sandlin decision is consistent with the opinions of most
state courts that have considered this issue. Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55
F.3d 1430, 1437 n.12 (9th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Ramirez v. State Bar, 619 P.2d 399, 404
(Cal. 1980) (affirming sanction when attorney made false statements about judges based
entirely on conjecture and without investigating accuracy of statements or factually substantiating allegations); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (upholding sanctions
because attorney's statements did not survive scrutiny under objective test); Louisiana State
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make critical statements that have a reasonable factual basis, even if the
statements turn out to be false. 12 The Ninth Circuit in Yagman claimed to
apply the Sandlin objective standard, yet it protected Yagman with the

broader shield of defamation law as it applies to the general public.I"
According to the Yagman court, courts must recognize that attorneys

who make statements impugning the integrity of the court may have other
First Amendment protections applicable in the defamation context." Those
protections include the absolute defense of truth, 29 with the burden of
showing falsity otherwise resting on the disciplinary body. 30 The court of

appeals concluded that courts cannot sanction statements impugning the
integrity of the court unless the statements are capable of being proved true
or false.13 ' Additionally, the Ninth Circuit declared that statements of
opinion receive First Amendment protection unless the statements intimate
a false assertion of fact. 132
Applying these standards, the court of appeals found that none of

Yagman's statements warranted sanction. 33 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that Yagman's statement that "[Judge Keller] has a penchant for sanctioning
Jewish lawyers. .

.

. I find this to be evidence of anti-[S]emitism" con-

Bar Ass'n v. Karst, 428 So. 2d 406, 409 (La. 1983) (sanctioning attorney because reasonable attorney would not have made such statements based on facts attorney knew or should
have known); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 321-22 (Minn. 1990) (using objective
standard in decision upholding attorney sanctions); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 837
(Mo. 1991) (endorsing objective reasonable attorney standard when determining whether
attorney statement constitutes ethical violation); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34 (N.Y.
1991) (per curiam) (upholding sanction when attorney falsely accused judge of misconduct
during in-chambers meeting before questioning any individuals who were present at that
meeting). But see State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (rex. Civ. App. 1974,
writ ref d n.r.e.) (adopting New York Times subjective malice standard).
126. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d. 1430, 1438 (9th Cir.
1995) (describing Sandlin standard as protecting critical statements that subsequently turn
out to be false if attorney can establish that reasonable factual basis existed in support of
such conclusions).
127. See id. at 1437-38 (purporting to apply objective standard yet relying on defamation case law rather than attorney professional responsibility cases).
128. Id. at 1438.
129. Id. (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (discussing protection
provided for true statements in defamation setting)).
130. Id. For a defamation case discussing plaintiff's burden to show falsity, see
PhiladelphiaNewspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776-77 (1986) (cited in Yagman,
55 F.3d at 1438).
131. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1438-42.
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tained an assertion of fact, as well as an expression of opinion.Y The
court of appeals assumed that the assertion of fact about Judge Keller's
propensity for sanctioning Jewish lawyers was truthful because the Standing
Committee did not claim otherwise." Thus, the Ninth Circuit deemed the
charge of anti-Semitism protected by the First Amendment as an opinion
that did not intimate a false assertion of fact." 6 Next, the court considered
Yagman's allegation that Judge Keller was dishonest. 7 Considering the
dishonesty allegation in context, the Ninth Circuit found that the statement
was not punishable because a reasonable interpreter would not find that the
statement accused Judge Keller of criminal misconduct.'
In evaluating
Yagman's string of insults - "ignorant," "ill-tempered," "buffoon," "substandard human," "right-wing fanatic," and "one of the worst judges in the
United States" - the court of appeals concluded that the First Amendment
protected Yagman because the statements were "rhetorical hyperbole,
'
incapable of being proved true or false."139

Finally, the Ninth Circuit

considered Yagman's statement that Judge Keller was "drunk on the
bench." 1" Rejecting Yagman's argument that the drinking accusation was
mere rhetorical hyperbole, the court of appeals found that the statement was
capable of being proved true or false. 4 ' The Ninth Circuit concluded that

the First Amendment shielded Yagman, however, because the Standing
Committee failed-to carry its burden to prove falsity. 42 Thus, the court of
134. Id. at 1438.
135. Id.

136. Id. at 1438, 1440. The Ninth Circuit stated that the anti-Semitic claim "convey[ed] Yagman's personal belief that Judge Keller is anti-Semitic. As such, it may be the
basis for sanctions only if it could reasonably be understood as declaring or implying actual
facts capable of being proved true or false." Id. at 1438-39. The court further stated that
the statement was "protected by the First Amendment as an expression of opinion based on

stated facts" and that "[e]ven if Yagman's statement were viewed as a bare allegation of
anti-Semitism, it might well qualify for protection under the First Amendment as mere
'name-calling.'" Id. at 1440 & n.17.

137. Id. at 1440.
138. Id.
139. M. The Ninth Circuit described the derogatory remarks as conveying "nothing

more substantive than Yagman's contempt for Judge Keller." Id.
140. Id. at 1441.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1441-42. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court had presumed
falsity and thereby "unconstitutionally relieved the Standing Committee of its duty to pro-

duce evidence on an element of its case. Without proof of falsity, Yagman's 'drunk on the
bench' allegation ... cannot support the imposition of sanctions for impugning the integrity
of the court."

d.
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appeals, in a two-to-one decision, concluded that none of Yagman's statements warranted sanction under the ethical rules because the First Amendment afforded Yagman the liberty to make such allegations.14 3

The court of appeals also considered whether the district court validly
sanctioned Yagman for interfering with the administration of justice when
he attempted to shop for a favorable judge.'" The Ninth Circuit found that
Yagman's statements did not constitute a punishable interference with the
administration of justice because there was no clear and present danger to
the proper functioning of the court system. 5 Although the court of appeals
recognized the harsh nature of Yagman's statements, 1" the court concluded
that the First Amendment protected Yagman's speech, however offensive,
and that the district court erred in sanctioning Yagman.14 7

V. Critiqueof the Yagman Decision
In reversing the ethical sanctions against Yagman, the Ninth Circuit
effectively rejected the notion that membership in the legal profession is
inextricably intertwined with special limitations on First Amendment
freedoms. 1" Although the Ninth Circuit purported to endorse the Sandlin
objective test,1 49 the court essentially resorted to common-law defamation
principles in its application of the test. 5 By importing a defamation
143. Id. at 1438-42.
144. See id. at 1442 (defining judge-shopping to include efforts to compel Judge Keller
to recuse himself in all cases when Yagman appeared as counsel).
145. Id. at 1445.
146. Id. at 1443.
147. Id. at 1445.
148. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 635-36 & n.16 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(observing that attorneys in pending cases are subject to ethical restrictions on speech to
which ordinary citizens are not); Wright, supra note 23, at 587 (noting that "[m]embership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions" (quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.))).
149. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1437-38 (9th Cir.
1995) (purporting to reject purely subjective standard applicable in defamation cases because
of standard's unsuitability to attorney disciplinary proceedings and stating that objective
standard governs); see also United States Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir.
1993) (adopting objective standard for determining whether to sanction attorneys for
statements about judicial system). In defining the objective standard, the Sandlin court
stated: "[We determine what the reasonable attorney, considered in light of all his professional functions, would do in the same or similar circumstances." Id.
150. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-45 (citing defamation cases and applying common-law libel standards to determine whether district court erroneously sanctioned Yagman).
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standard, the court of appeals unmasked its opposition to institutional
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of attorneys."'
Instead of following the traditional reasoning of courts that have
afforded attorneys less First Amendment protection," the Ninth Circuit
departed from existing Supreme Court and circuit court jurisprudence by
concluding that, unless an attorney's statements are libelous, 5 3 neither the
disciplinary body nor the court can sanction the attorney." The Yagman
court's application of a common-law defamation standard"55 roughly equates
151. See id. at 1445 (concluding with quote that emphasizes First Amendment rights).
The Yagman court concluded its opinion by reiterating the words of Justice Black:
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges
from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public
opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not
always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced
silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the
bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more
than it would enhance respect.
Id. (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941) (Black, J.)).
152. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (recognizing that states can
regulate more freely speech of attorneys participating in pending cases than ordinary citizens
because attorneys have special obligations to ensure fair administration of justice); Sawyer,
360 U.S. at 646-67 (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to join in "intimation that a lawyer
can invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize himself from evenhanded
discipline for proven unethical conduct"). Justice Stewart further asserted that "obedience
to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other circumstances might be
constitutionally protected speech." Id. (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Ramirez v. State
Bar, 619 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1980) (concluding that "outrageous" and "unwarranted"
statements by attorneys concerning judicial officers did not deserve First Amendment
protection).
153. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438.
154. See In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995) (crititizing Yagman court
for potentially extending attorneys' First Amendment speech rights and departing from court
precedents), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1854 (1996). The Palmisano court asserted:
Tothe extent Standing Committee v. Yagman may hold that attorneys are entitled
to excoriate judges in the same way, and with the same lack of investigation, as
persons may attack political officeholders, it is inconsistent with Gentile and our
own precedents ....
Even a statement cast in the form of an opinion ("I think
that Judge X is dishonest") implies a factual basis, and the lack of support for
that implied factual assertion may be a proper basis for a penalty.
Id. (citations omitted).
155. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438. But see id. at 1437-38 (distinguishing attorney discipline proceedings from defamation cases and claiming to adopt Sandlin objective standard
because attorneys do not have full protective shield of defamation law standard). Although
the Ninth Circuit voiced its endorsement of the Sandlin objective test and claimed to
recognize the special limitations on attorney free speech rights, the court almost exclusively
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attorney free speech rights with those of the ordinary citizen engaged in

political debate. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's expansion of attorney speech
rights156 conflicts with the Supreme Court's constriction of these rights."
By increasing attorneys' free speech protection, the Ninth Circuit
undermined the policies of protecting the legal system's integrity, the
public's confidence in it, and the fair administration of justice.15 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit heavily relied on common-law defamation principles, even though the court purported to adopt the Sandlin objective test
based on its suitability to attorney disciplinary proceedings." 9 In so doing,
cited defamation cases, not attorney discipline cases. Id. In this discussion, the Ninth
Circuit cited only one attorney discipline case, Oklahoma ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Porter,766 P.2d 958, 967 (Okla. 1988), in which the court dismissed a request for sanctions against an attorney because it found no proof of falsity. Id. Porterrepresents the
minority view in that it refused to treat judges differently than other public officials and
applied the traditional defamation standards. Porter,766 P.2d at 962-67. Elaborating on
the standards it intended to apply, the Yagman court stated:
To begin with, attorneys may be sanctioned for impugning the integrity of a
judge or the court only if their statements are false; truth is an absolute defense.
Moreover, the disciplinary body bears the burden of proving falsity.
It follows that statements impugning the integrity of a judge may not be
punished unless they are capable of being proved true or false; statements of
opinion are protected by the First Amendment unless they "imply a false assertion of fact." Even statements that at first blush appear to be factual are protected by the First Amendment if they cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about their target. Thus, statements of "rhetorical hyperbole" aren't
sanctionable, nor are statements that use language in a "loose, figurative sense."
With these principles in mind, we examine the statements for which Yagman
was disciplined.
Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1438 (citations omitted). Notably, the Yagman court relied on
common-law defamation standards throughout its analysis despite the fact that it was
deciding an attorney discipline case for which ample precedent existed. See id. (citing
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977)).

156. See Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437-44 (purporting to apply Sandlin objective standard
while effectively allowing Yagman's critical statements to have virtually full First Amendment protection).
157. See Palmisano, 70 F.3d at 487 (reasoning that Constitution does not give attorneys
same freedoms as participants in political debates); supra note 32 and accompanying text
(providing cases that endorse view that attorneys have fewer First Amendment rights).
158. See generally Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc,
Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (No. 94-55918)
(providing detailed critique of Ninth Circuit's holding in Yagman).
159. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (illustrating inconsistency in Ninth Circuit's reliance on defamation cases as authority rather than citing attorney disciplinary
cases).
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the Ninth Circuit ignored the foundations of ethical restrictions on attorney
speech. By considering whether Yagman's statements constituted opinion
or rhetorical hyperbole, the Ninth Circuit departed from the Sandlin objective standard and created a conflict with courts that have adopted the

objective standard and its policies." 6 In fact, the Ninth Circuit's mode of
analysis clashes with Supreme Court jurisprudence on attorneys' First
Amendment rights.' The traditional attorney discipline jurisprudence, in
contrast to the Yagman decision, has continuously upheld the validity of
ethical rules that require a higher standard of conduct from attorneys and
that afford them fewer First Amendment safeguards." By applying the
First Amendment's protective shield to Yagman, the Ninth Circuit violated
the policy objectives and principles justifying the limitation of First Amendment rights that are afforded to attorneys.
VI. Discussionof Analogous Jurisprudence
A discussion of the desirability of granting attorneys restricted First
Amendment rights finds support in an examination of analogous free speech
160. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State Bar of Cal., 619 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1980) (endorsing
objective standard to determine whether attorney violated ethical rule restricting attorney
criticism); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (same); In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d
313, 322 (Minn. 1990) (same); In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 837 (Mo. 1991) (en banc)
(rejecting purely subjective standard based on policy rationales of protecting public, administration of justice, and legal profession's integrity); In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34
(N.Y. 1991) (same).
161. Compare Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1436-42, with In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45
(1985) (declaring that license to practice law carries obligation to conduct oneself in manner
that comports with role of courts), n re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (stating that attorneys' ethical obligations "may require abstention from what in
other circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech"), and Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 355 (1871) (asserting that at all times attorneys have obligation to
refrain from insulting judiciary). For an example of the Supreme Court's constriction of
attorney First Amendment liberties in another context, see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 2371, 2383 (1995) (upholding thirty-day restriction on attorney advertising to
prevent invasions of privacy by lawyers and erosion of public's perception of legal profession against which ABA organizations can actively regulate).
162. See, e.g., In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95-96 (Ind. 1979) (prohibiting lawyer
criticism of court's opinion); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768-69 (Iowa 1976) (barring
attorney criticism of court's decision); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165,
168-69 (Ky. 1980) (disciplining attorney for statements made in public about judiciary); In
re Raggio, 487 P.2d 499, 500-01 (Nev. 1971) (prohibiting attorney criticism of court's
holding); see also Molley, supra note 43, at 490 (discussing how courts have imposed
numerous harsh sanctions, including public reprimand, suspension, and disbarment based
on contention that free speech concerns do not outweigh state's interest in defending its
public officials).
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Two areas in particular - Hatch Act limitation on politi-

cal participation of government employees and university hate speech code
restrictions on student speech - provide useful insight into how the legal

profession should balance the need to restrain attorney criticism of the
judiciary with attorneys' First Amendment guarantees." The Hatch Act
provides an example of a constitutionally permissible restriction of the
rights of a particular subset of individuals based upon their professional
status." The Hatch Act restricts the First Amendment rights of federal
employees," and the Supreme Court has determined that such restrictions

are constitutional. 67 University hate speech code cases illustrate the difficulty in crafting constitutional restrictions on the First Amendment rights
of students. 68 Because of such difficulty, courts consistently have found
university 69hate speech codes to be invalid restraints on First Amendment
freedoms.

1

Although neither of these areas addresses the specific policy concerns
of the legal profession, both clarify the constitutionality of holding a particular group of individuals to a higher set of standards based on their mem163. See infra Part VI.A-B (discussing parallel issues present in Hatch Act and hate
speech code arenas).
164. See infra Part VI.A.1 (exploring Hatch Act jurisprudence in which government interest outweighed First Amendment right to engage in partisan political activities); infra Part VI.B.1-2 (summarizing hate speech code debate in which First Amendment
has repeatedly trumped policy arguments supporting restraints on students' offensive
speech).
165. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508, 7321-7326 (1994) (restraining First Amendment
activity of federal employees by specifically regulating political activity); cf. Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (acknowledging that federal government has
interests in regulating "the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it
possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general").
166. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7323-7324 (limiting federal employees' freedom to participate in
partisan political activities).
167. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 556 (1973) (concluding that challenged speech restrictions of Hatch Act were
constitutional); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103-04 (1947) (finding that
Hatch Act survived constitutional scrutiny).
168. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (finding hate speech code fatally overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (concluding hate speech code
was unconstitutionally overbroad because code restricted protected speech); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (ruling that hate speech code was
unconstitutional because it was overbroad both on its face and as applied in that it punished
protected speech).
169. See infra Part VI.B.2 (discussing extent to which courts have found that hate
speech codes do not survive First Amendment scrutiny).
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bership in a regulated organization or environment. 10 Because of their
different results and policy justifications, these two areas of law offer
guidance to the judiciary's and to the legal profession's efforts to resolve
the important considerations at stake in the attorney speech debate. 7' After
exploring the two analogues and analyzing their relevance to the judicial
criticism issue, this Note concludes that the justifications for restricting
attorney speech more closely resemble the Hatch Act paradigm than the
hate speech code context." Accordingly, this Note ultimately asserts that
the traditional restrictions on attorney speech are constitutional and that the
Yagman court incorrectly trumped the ethical restrictions with the First
Amendment on the mistaken belief that attorneys possess the same free
speech rights as ordinary citizens. 73

A. The Restriction of FirstAmendment Rights of Federal
Employees Under the Hatch Act
The Hatch Act 74 imposes restrictions on the political activity of fed-

eral employees."75 Specifically, the Hatch Act prohibits covered employ-

170. See infra Part VI.A.2 (describing guidance Hatch Act jurisprudence lends to
question of whether First Amendment rights can be restricted due to membership in particular profession); infra Part VI.B.3 (exploring lessons from failure of hate speech codes
to restrict First Amendment rights of students based upon their educational environment).
171. See infra Part VII (extracting lessons from Hatch Act and hate speech code
jurisprudence and ultimately suggesting approach for dealing with attorney criticism in light
of First Amendment interests and ethical concerns at stake).
172. See infra Part VII (determining that policies supporting restrictions of attorney
criticism are more closely aligned with interests justifying Hatch Act restrictions than with
interests underlying hate speech codes).
173. See infra Part VII (concluding that ethical codes restricting attorney speech are
constitutional and that Yagman court erred in providing Yagman with layperson's First
Amendment protections).
174. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508, 7321-7326 (1994). Sections 7321 through 7326 govern
federal employees and officials, and §§ 1501 through 1508 impose analogous prohibitions
on certain state employees working in programs that the government finances in whole or
in part. The primary restraints on partisan activity in the federal sector appear in § 7323
and § 7324. The pertinent portion of § 7323 provides:
(a) Subject to the provisions of subsection (b), an employee may take an active part
in political management or in political campaigns, except an employee may not (1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or
affecting the result of an election;
(2) knowingly solicit, accept, or receive a political contribution from any
person . ...
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ees 76 from using their official authority to interfere with or to affect an
election or a nomination result; 1" from soliciting contributions for political
hd. § 7323(a). According to § 7323(b)(2)(A), employees that are listed within § 7323(b)(2)(B)
cannot "take an active part in political management or political campaigns." Id.
§ 7323(b)(2)(A). Subsection 7323(b)(2)(B) provides a list of bureaucratic entities whose
employees must refrain from actively participating in partisan politics. Id. § 7323(b)(2)(B).
The following are some of the entities listed within § 7323(b)(2)(B): the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Internal Revenue Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National
Security Council. Id. Section 7324 provides a blanket proscription against engaging in
political activity under certain circumstances. Id. § 7324. The relevant portion reads as
follows:
(a) An employee may not engage in political activity (1) while the employee is on duty;
(2) in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official duties by an
individual employed or holding office in the Government of the United States or any
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(3) while wearing a uniform or official insignia identifying the office or position
of the employee, or
(4) using any vehicle owned or leased by the Government of the United States
or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
Id. § 7324(a).
175. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 5.12, at 320 (1994)
(explaining that Hatch Act restrains political activity in federal sector).
176. See 5 U.S.C. § 7322(1) (defining federal "employee" covered under Hatch Act).
Section 7322(1) states:
(1) "employee" means any individual, other than the President and Vice President,
employed or holding office in (A) an Executive agency other than the General Accounting Office;
(B) a position within the competitive service which is not in an Executive
agency; or
(C) the government of the District of Columbia, other than the Mayor or a
member of the City Council or the Recorder of Deeds; but does not include a
member of the uniform services ....
Id.; see also id. § 1501(4)(A)-(B) (defining category of "state or local officer or employee"
that Hatch Act covers). Section 1501 states:
(4) "State or local officer or employee" means an individual employed by a State
or local agency whose principal employment is in connection with an activity which
is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made by the United States or a
Federal agency, but does not include (A) an individual who exercises no functions in connection with that activity; or
(B) an individual employed by an educational or research institution, establishment, agency, or system which is supported in whole or in part by a State or
political subdivision thereof, or by a recognized religious, philanthropic, or cultural
organization.
Id.
177. Id. §§ 1502(a)(1), 7323(a)(1); see McKechnie v. McDermott, 595 F. Supp. 672,
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purposes from another covered employee;178 or from becoming a political
candidate. 79 The Hatch Act does, however, allow covered employees the
right to vote for the candidate of their choice and the right to express
personal opinions on political subjects and candidates." s Hatch Act prohibitions apply to almost all employees of the executive branch of the federal
government and to state and local employees whose employers receive
federal funding.18 1 In addition, all fifty states have enacted statutes modeled
after the Hatch Act, which similarly restrict the political activities of state
employees. m
The primary purpose of the Hatch Act is to secure the federal Government's political neutrality." Because of the strong policy interests at stake,
674-76 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (finding that city employee's control over advertising and promotion on city buses to assist campaign for election of partisan candidate and campaign
participation during work hours constituted violation of Hatch Act).
178. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1502(a)(2), 7323(a)(2). Section 1502(a)(2) prohibits covered employees from "directly or indirectly coerc[ing], attempt[ing] to coerce, command[ing], or
advis[ing] a State or local officer or employee to pay, lend, or contribute anything of value
to a party, committee, organization, agency, or person for political purposes." Id.
§ 1502(a)(2); see also Bauers v. Comett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1526 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that
state employee violated Missouri law and Hatch Act because posting flyers to solicit funds
for lobbyist was partisan political activity within meaning of Hatch Act).
179. See 5 U.S.C. § 7323(a)(3) (prohibiting covered employee from running for nomination or seeking to be partisan political candidate); id. § 1502(a)(3) (providing that covered
employee cannot "be a candidate for elective office"); State v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd.,
875 F.2d 179, 184 (8th Cir. 1988) (concluding that state employee knowingly violated Hatch
Act on becoming candidate in partisan election warranting removal from state employment);
cf. Special Counsel v. Bradford, 62 M.S.P.R. 239, 240-41 (M.S.P.B. 1994) (rejecting
settlement agreement reached in Hatch Act case that allowed federal employee to retain both
her federal government position and her elected, partisan Board of Education seat), modified, 69 M.S.P.R. 247 (M.S.P.B. 1995).
180. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1502(b), 7323(c).
181. See ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 175, § 5.12, at 320 (describing coverage of
Hatch Act prohibitions).
182. Id.
183. Id. According to Rothstein, the statute's purpose is "to prevent the bureaucracy
from becoming a unified political power, to prevent the party in power from using government workers improperly, to prevent competition between the party and the department
heads, and to prevent employee demoralization based on politics, not merit." Id.
For a discussion of the legislative history and purpose of the operative provision of
the Hatch Act, see generally S. REP. No. 93-689 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5587. See also S. REP. No. 101-165, at 2 (1990) (articulating that underlying rationale for
nonpartisan civil service is belief that efficiency in government service necessitates lack of
partisan administration). The Senate report concerns the Hatch Act Reform Amendment of
1989, S. 135, 101st Cong., which attempted to expand the freedoms of covered employees
under the Hatch Act. Id. at 1-2. President Bush, however, vetoed the amendment and
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employees who violate the Hatch Act may receive penalties ranging from
thirty days unpaid suspension to removal from office."8

Despite the

sanction's severity, courts have found that such an infringement on constitutional rights does not outweigh the policy interests supporting Hatch Act
restrictions. '1
1. Leading Hatch Act Cases
Although the Hatch Act has survived constitutional scrutiny, both
Congress and the Supreme Court have acknowledged and grappled with the

First Amendment concerns it raises.186 The Supreme Court specifically has
rejected First Amendment challenges to the Hatch Act's prohibitions. 187 In
Congress did not override his veto. See For the Record, WASH. POST, June 28, 1990, at
V17, available in Westlaw 2123720 ("By a vote of 327 for and 93 against, the House
overrode President Bush's veto of a bill (HR 20) permitting civil servants and postal workers
limited involvement in partisan politics in the 51-year-old Hatch Act. But the bill died when
the Senate ...

later upheld the veto.").

184. 5 U.S.C. § 7326 (1994) (providing that if "the Merit Systems Protection Board
finds by unanimous vote that the violation does not warrant removal, a penalty of not less
than 30 days' suspension without pay shall be imposed"); id. § 1505(1)-(2) (providing that
following hearing, Civil Service Commission determines whether employee or'officer
violated § 1502 of Hatch Act and, if so, whether such violation warranted removal from
employment or office); see In re Ramshaw, 266 F. Supp. 73, 75 (D. Idaho 1967) (determining that discharge of civil service employee who violated Hatch Act prohibitions by taking
part in political campaign (running for sheriff) fully complied with applicable law); Special
Counsel v. Blackburne, 58 M.S.P.R. 279, 282-85 (M.S.P.B. 1993) (concluding that state
agency employee's violation of Hatch Act warranted removal even though employee was on
leave of absence and had relied on agency's advice that Hatch Act prohibition did not apply
if on leave of absence); Special Counsel v. Brondyk, 42 M.S.P.R. 333, 337-39 (M.S.P.B.
1989) (finding that local government employee's violation of Hatch Act in becoming
Republican candidate for county sheriff warranted removal, notwithstanding employee's
thirty-year exemplary work record and alleged reliance on advice of state official).
185. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548, 579-81 (1973) (finding that Hatch Act restrictions on political activity were
constitutional); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 103-04 (1947) (finding that
Hatch Act provisions survived First Amendment scrutiny).
186. See S. REP. No. 101-165, at 22-23 (1990) (recognizing potential First Amendment
problems). The Senate report stated that the American Civil Liberties Union testified in
1989 before Congress that the Hatch Act violated the First Amendment, but the Supreme
Court specifically rejected that argument. Id.
187. See Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 556 (concluding that Hatch Act restrictions on
political activity was constitutional); Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 103-04 (finding that Hatch Act
provisions survived First Amendment scrutiny); cf. Northem Va. Regional Park Auth. v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 437 F.2d 1346, 1350-51 (4th Cir. 1971) (determining
that Hatch Act does not violate First Amendment).
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1947, the Supreme Court in United Public Workers, C.L O. v. Mitchell"a

examined the Hatch Act's prohibition against off-duty political activity.189
The Supreme Court concluded that there is no distinction between on-duty
and off-duty political activities because the policies supporting on-duty

restrictions also justify off-duty limitations."190 Further, the Mitchell Court
concluded that the impermissible influence by government officials on
political activity does not diminish just because the political activity takes
place after hours, and therefore, it rejected the First Amendment challenge
to the Hatch Act.191
More than twenty years later, in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,'91 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of the Hatch Act's prohibition of federal
employees taking an active part in political campaigns."9 In determining
188. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
189. See Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 94, 103-04 (upholding constitutionality of Hatch Act
notwithstanding First Amendment attack). In Mitchell, the Supreme Court considered
whether Hatch Act provisions prohibiting executive branch officers and employees from
taking any active part in political management or campaigns under penalty of immediate
removal were constitutional as applied. Id. at 94. Under the Hatch Act, the statutorily
authorized body removed the plaintiff, an industrial worker, from office because he acted
as a ward executive committee person and worked at the polls during his free time. Id. at
91-92 nn.23-24. Mitchell claimed that the Hatch Act prohibitions did not extend to off-duty
political activities. Id. at 95. First, the Court defined the legislative latitude that Congress
possesses. Id. at 96-104. The Court reasoned that Congress had the authority to regulate
the political conduct of government employees within reasonable limits. Id. at 102. While
recognizing that the Hatch Act prohibition at issue infringed to some extent upon unfettered
political action, the Court nevertheless concluded that the extent of the regulation of political
activity of federal employees rested primarily with Congress. Id. According to the Court,
courts may interfere only when such restrictions pass beyond the general existing conception
of governmental power, as developed "from practice, history, and changing educational,
social, and economic conditions." Id. at 102-03. The Court rejected the petitioner's
argument that a significant distinction existed between on-duty and off-duty political activity.
Id. at 95. The Court dismissed plaintiff's off-duty distinction because a comparable risk of
impermissible influence exists after work hours. Id. Ultimately, the Court found that the
challenged provision of the Hatch Act did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 104.
190. Id. at 95.
191. Id. at 103.
192. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
193. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 550, 579-81 (1973) (finding that Hatch Act prohibitions of participation in political
management and in political campaigns are constitutional). In Letter Carriers,the Supreme
Court considered whether the statutory definition of "political activity" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 568. The union challenging the Hatch Act prohibitions
on behalf of employees who wanted:
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whether the challenged provisions of the Hatch Act were unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, the Supreme Court upheld Congress's power to enact

a full panoply of restrictions on partisan political activity of federal employees. 1 4 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that the Hatch Act's
prohibitions did not violate the First Amendment."
The Supreme Court's validation of the Hatch Act demonstrates that

when policy concerns outweigh First Amendment considerations, statutes
or rules can constitutionally impose severe limitations on the First Amend-

ment rights of individuals based on their professional status or environment. 196 By upholding Hatch Act restrictions, the Supreme Court has found
that the policy goal of securing the political neutrality of federal government employees and officers outweighs any potential chilling effect on First
Amendment liberties.

19

In 1990, President Bush vetoed a congressional

to run in state and local elections for the school board, for city council, for
mayor; to write letters on political subjects to newspapers; to be a delegate in
a political convention; to run for an office and hold office in a political party
or political club; to campaign for candidates for political office; [and] to work
at polling places in behalf of a political party.
Id. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Because the language of 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (currently codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 7323(b)(2)(A)) swept within its prohibitions all of
the political activities that the petitioners wished to pursue, petitioners asserted that the
Hatch Act prohibition against federal employees taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns" was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 568.
According to the Court, however, Congress had the authority to enact, in plain and understandable language, the following section, which prohibits:
[O]rganizing a political party or club; actively participating in fund-raising
activities for a partisan candidate or political party; becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office; actively managing the
campaign of a partisan candidate for public office; initiating or circulating a
partisan nominating petition or soliciting votes for a partisan candidate for
public office; or serving as a delegate, alternate or proxy to a political party
convention.
Id. at 556. Moreover, the Supreme Court found that neither the First Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution invalidated laws barring such partisan political conduct
by federal employees. Id. at 564-67, 579-81. Accordingly, the Supreme Court determined
that the Hatch Act provisions at issue were not impermissibly vague or overbroad. Id. at
579-81.
194. Id. at 556.
195. Id. at 579-81.
196. See id. (finding that First Amendment restrictions on government employees under
Hatch Act survive constitutional scrutiny); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
103-04 (1947) (same).
197. See supra Part VI.A.1 (discussing Supreme Court's treatment of Hatch Act policy
justifications).
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attempt to liberalize the Hatch Act restrictions. 98

Although Congress

amended the Hatch Act in 1993,19 the Hatch Act continues to impose
substantial restrictions on federal employees' First Amendment rights.
2. Insight Provided by Hatch Act Jurisprudence
Hatch Act jurisprudence provides guidance in the debate concerning

attorney criticism of the judiciary. Significantly, the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act affirms the principle that voluntary membership or employment
in a regulated profession can entail surrendering a certain portion of First
Amendment protection.'

The Supreme Court has applied this same

principle to the legal profession and has endorsed such restricted rights for
attorneys."1 Thus, sanctioning an attorney for speech that would receive

First Amendment protection if uttered by an ordinary citizen does not
necessarily create a constitutional dilemma.

The Supreme Court has

resolved the constitutional issue by ruling that, given the proper environment and legitimate government interests, employment can entail the
acceptance of reduced First Amendment rights.' Therefore, an important
issue in the attorney criticism debate is whether legitimate justifications
exist for providing attorneys with less First Amendment protection. 30
198. See For the Record, supra note 183, at V17 ("The bill sought to give an estimated
three million federal employees the opportunity to take part in political campaigns and
causes off the job, but stopped short of allowing them to seek public office."). Opponents
of the Hatch Act Amendments of 1990 asserted that the adoption would have been a virtual
repeal of the Hatch Act allowing the federal employees to "hold office in a political party,
work in partisan political campaigns or in party organizations, publicly endorse partisan
candidates and urge others to support them; and solicit political contributions from fellow
federal employees in certain circumstances." Letter from Carol T. Crawford, Assistant
Attorney General, to Hon. John Glenn (July 24, 1989), quoted in S. REP. No. 101-165, at
26, 27 (1990). According to a 1989 poll, over sixty percent of federal employees actually
opposed a loosening of the Hatch Act. Id. at 22.
199. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001.
200. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 564-67 (1973) (endorsing constitutionality of Hatch Act restrictions based upon government interests in regulating government employees); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 102-03 (1947) (same).
201. See supra notes 26, 32, and accompanying text (providing Supreme Court's
endorsement of limited First Amendment rights for attorneys).
202. See Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 564-67 (finding Hatch Act restrictions constitutional based upon special needs and policy interests of government employment); Mitchell,
330 U.S. at 96-104 (same).
203. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text (evaluating policies and interests at
stake in attorney criticism debate in light of limitations on First Amendment freedoms).
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Similarities between attorney free speech jurisprudence and Hatch Act
jurisprudence suggest that restrictions on attorney speech require similar
treatment. The Hatch Act regulates political speech. Traditionally, political speech represents a class of speech that this nation holds most sacred.
The speech restricted by codes of professional ethics is most similar to
speech that receives no protection under the First Amendment, such as false
statements and obscenity.'

Even though the Hatch Act infringes on

political speech, which lies at the heart of the First Amendment, the Hatch
Act restrictions have survived First Amendment attack. The Supreme Court
has allowed the Hatch Act to infringe on First Amendment rights because
the interests at stake justify the restrictions. Thus, if the policies supporting
restrictions on attorney speech are as strong as the policies underlying the
Hatch Act, then restrictions on attorney criticism should withstand First
Amendment challenge.
In upholding the constitutionality of the Hatch Act restrictions, the
Supreme Court pointed to the legitimate government interests in securing
political neutrality and in protecting government employees from undue
political influence. Interests supporting restrictions on attorney criticism are
similarly legitimate. Both proponents of the restrictions and the courts have
justified limiting First Amendment freedoms on the basis of the following
primary policy concerns: upholding the public's image of the legal profession and the law, maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality, and
guaranteeing noninterference with the administration of justice.' Unre204. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1973) (concluding that
obscenity does not receive protection of First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 483 (1957) (concluding that obscenity is "outside the protection intended for speech").
205. See, e.g., In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that
attorney's letter to judge questioning judge's competence and impartiality, written during
pendency of appeal, amounted to attempt to prejudice administration of justice); In re
Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1973) (finding that attorney's statement that judge was
avoiding performance of his sworn duty was "calculated to cast a cloud of suspicion upon
the entire judiciary"); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. 1979) ("Unwarranted public
suggestion by an attorney that a judicial officer is motivated by criminal purposes and
considerations does nothing but weaken and erode the public's confidence in an impartial
adjudicatory process."); Committee on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129,
130 (Iowa 1980) ("To permit unfettered criticism regardless of the motive would tend to
intimidate judges in the performance of their duties and would foster unwarranted criticism
of our courts."); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980)
(attorney's press conference statements that judge's behavior was unethical and grossly
unfair tended to "bring the bench and bar into disrepute and to undermine public confidence
in the integrity of our judicial process"); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 29, § 11.3.2, at
601-02 (noting that some courts endorse conclusion that attorney criticism of judiciary
causes public disrespect for judiciary or law generally).
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strained attorney criticism of the type Yagman levied against Judge Keller
frustrates the three policy interests that support the restrictions. Yagman's
public statements easily could have damaged the judiciary's public image
and led many to conclude that Judge Keller was in no way impartial.

In

addition, Yagman specifically stated to another attorney his intention to
force Judge Keller to recuse himself from future proceedings. Yagman's

effort to disrupt the random assignment of judges by publicly attacking the
judiciary demonstrates Yagman's direct attempt to interfere with the administration of justice.
Proponents of attorney speech restrictions also point to the fact that

attorneys implicitly consent to a restricted level of First Amendment rights
Upon entering the profession,
when they enter the legal profession.'
Yagman accepted the obligation to meet higher standards of conduct as

established by the ABA, state bar associations, and local court rules.
Because of the similarities between the interests at stake and the differences

between the types of speech regulated by the Hatch Act and the attorney
ethics codes, courts should hold that attorney speech can be restrained

without violating the First Amendment as one of the burdens associated
with membership in the legal profession.
B. The Restriction of FirstAmendment Rights of College Students
Under University Hate Speech Codes
Although the Hatch Act has survived First Amendment challenges,
university hate speech codes have not withstood constitutional scrutiny.'
206. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 635-36 & n.16 (1959) (plurality opinion)
(observing that attorneys in pending cases are subject to ethical restrictions on speech to
which ordinary citizens are not); Wright, supra note 23, at 587 (noting that "[m]embership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions" (quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin,
162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.))); cf. United States Dist. Court v. Sandlin,
12 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[Olnce a lawyer is admitted to the bar, although he does
not surrender his freedom of expression, he must temper his criticisms in accordance with
professional standards of conduct.").
207. See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th
Cir. 1993) (finding that university fraternity had First Amendment protection when fraternity
sponsored "ugly women contest" that included sexual and racial epithets); Dambrot v.
Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that university
hate speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents
of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172-73 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (concluding that hate
speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad because code restricted nonfighting words);
Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (ruling that hate
speech code was unconstitutional because it was content-based, overbroad both on its face
and as applied, and impermissibly vague). But cf. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,
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The different results reached in these two areas demonstrate the spectrum
of approaches and interests involved. The solution to the attorney free
speech controversy lies somewhere between the teachings of the Hatch Act
cases and the hate speech code cases. Therefore, a survey of the primary
hate speech code cases also guides the attorney free speech debate.
The hate speech code cases are relevant to the attorney criticism controversy for two reasons. First, the policy arguments in favor of restricting
freedom of speech on campuses parallel the rationales supporting restrictions on attorney speech. Second, hate speech codes have not survived
First Amendment challenges despite the strong policy interests underlying
the creation of such codes. Thus, a general understanding of the policies
advanced by, and the reasons for the constitutional infirmity of, hate speech
codes provide insight into how the legal profession and the courts should
balance First Amendment interests against the harms of attorney criticism
of the judiciary.
1. Policy Arguments Supporting Hate Speech Codes
A common theme among proponents of hate speech codes is the fear
that hate speech will deny students equal protection under the law." s
Proponents argue that students will not receive equal protection from
harassment, intimidation, or hostile speech premised on an individual's
race, ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or other protected status. 2 9
Further, hate speech code proponents contend that minorities have suffered
from decades of discrimination and, thus, that educational institutions must
protect those minority groups from the direct, immediate, and substantial
injury that stems from the invidious discrimination of hate speech.10
478 (1993) (holding that hate crime sentencing enhancement regulation was constitutional
because it targeted conduct unprotected by First Amendment and was not regulation of
thought).
208. See Richard Kirk Page & Kay Hartwell Hunnicutt, Freedomfor the Thought That

We Hate: A Policy Analysis of Student Speech Regulation at America's Twenty Largest
Public Universities, 21 J.C. & U.L. 1, 6 (1994) (stating that equal protection is one primary
goal of hate speech code advocates).
209. See id. at 6-7 (stating that equal protection for students in educational setting
includes freedom from harassment, intimidation, or hostile speech that is based on race,

ethnicity, religion, gender, national origin, or other protected status).
210.

See id. at7 (presenting arguments of proponents of hate speech codes who strongly

believe hate speech is form of invidious discrimination). For a discussion of the extent to
which hate speech directly harms minority groups who have been subject to decades of

discrimination, see generally Alan Borovy et al., Language as Violence v. Freedom of
Expression: Canadianand American Perspectiveson Group Defamation, 37 BUFF. L. REv.

337 (1989); Kenneth Lasson, RacialDefamation as Free Speech: Abusing the FirstAmend-
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Although equal protection arguments represent potential justifications for
hate speech codes, proponents of.restrictions on attorney criticism emphasize protection of the legal profession's reputation, maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality, and ensuring noninterference with the administration of justice."'

A basic premise in the argument in favor of hate speech codes comports with arguments in favor of restrictions on attorney criticism of the
judiciary. Both arguments posit that restrictions apply to individuals based
on their choice to become members of a regulated institution or profession.212 Upon entrance into regulated environments or professions, individuals implicitly consent to comply with a higher standard of conduct, such
ment, 17 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 11 (1985); and Charles R. Lawrence, Ell, If He
HollersLet Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Charles
R. Lawrence, III, Speech That Harms:An Exchange - Acknowledging the Victims' Cry, 76
ACADEME 10 (1990).
211. See, e.g., In re Evans, 801 F.2d 703, 706-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that
attorney's letter to judge questioning judge's competence and impartiality, written during
pendency of appeal, amounted to attempt to prejudice administration of justice); In re
Shimek, 284 So. 2d 686, 689 (Fla. 1973) (finding that attorney's statement that judge was
avoiding performance of his sworn duty was "calculated to cast a cloud of suspicion upon
the entire judiciary"); In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Ind. 1979) ("Unwarranted public
suggestion by an attorney that a judicial officer is motivated by criminal purposes and
considerations does nothing but weaken and erode the public's confidence in an impartial
adjudicatory process."); Committee on Profl Ethics & Conduct v. Horak, 292 N.W.2d 129,
130 (Iowa 1980) ("To permit unfettered criticism regardless of the motive would tend to
intimidate judges in the performance of their duties and would foster unwarranted criticism
of our courts."); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980)
(finding attorney's statements at press conference that judge's behavior was unethical and
grossly unfair tended to "bring the bench and bar into disrepute and to undermine public
confidence in the integrity of the judicial process"); see also WOLFRAM, supra note 29,
§ 11.3.2, at 601-02 (noting that some courts endorse conclusion that attorney criticism of
judiciary causes public disrespect for judiciary or law generally).
212. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644-45 (1985) (reasoning that "license
granted by the court requires members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of courts in the administration of justice"); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622,
646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "[o]bedience to ethical precepts may
require abstention from what in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected
speech"); In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Iowa 1976) (recognizing that "lawyer,
acting in professional capacity, may have some fewer rights of free speech than would a
private citizen"); In re Johnson, 729 P.2d 1175, 1179 (Kan. 1986) (finding that one purpose
of disciplinary action is to enforce "honorable conduct on the part of the court's own
officers"); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Michaelis, 316 N.W.2d 46, 53 (Neb. 1982)
(proclaiming that "lawyer belongs to a profession with inherited standards of propriety and
honor, which experience has shown necessary in a calling dedicated to the accomplishment
of justice").
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as the ones that universities or professional associations establish. Thus,

individuals that choose to become members of communities which, for
legitimate policy reasons, insist on protection of the integrity of the community and the integrity of its members may not have the full range of free
speech rights that the ordinary citizen enjoys.213 Despite a similar foundation, hate speech codes have withered under First Amendment attack,
whereas ethical rules have long provided an effective means for sanctioning
attorney criticism of the judiciary, notwithstanding First Amendment
claims - at least before the Yagman decision.214

2. Leading Hate Speech Code Cases
Plaintiffs have raised successful challenges to hate speech codes at
public universities.2" 5 In Doe v. University of Michigan,26 the university

hate speech code denied a biopsychology student the opportunity to discuss
biological differences between sexes and races.2 7 The district court found
that the speech code was unconstitutional because the code prohibited
213. See supra note 212 (providing cases in which courts endorsed principle that
attorneys surrender some First Amendment protection upon entry into legal profession).
214. See Reuben, supra note 9, at 23 (reporting that legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers
believes Ninth Circuit opinion reverses modern trend by ruling in favor of attorney free
speech rights).
215. See James R. Bussian, Comment, Anatomy of the Campus Speech Code: An Examinationof PrevailingRegulations, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 153, 171-73 (1995) (discussing recent
First Amendment challenges to hate speech code cases in which courts have struck down
codes).
216. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
217. See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 858, 866-67 (E.D. Mich.
1989) (concluding that hate speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague). In
Doe, the district court considered whether University of Michigan's hate speech code
withstood First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 853-54. In response to racist activities on
campus, including posted fliers declaring "open season on blacks," the university drafted a
hate speech code. Id. at 854-58. The code proscribed as punishable, "[a]ny behavior,
verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis" of protected
class status "and that a. [i]nvolves an express or implied threat to an individual's academic
efforts . . . or b. [h]as the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with
an individual's academic efforts, employment, [or] participation in University sponsored
extra-curricular activities." Id. at 856. Doe, a psychology graduate student, wanted to
discuss genetic and biological differences between the sexes and races. Id. at 858. The
primary focus of Doe's graduate study concerned the "interdisciplinary study of the biological bases of individual differences in personality traits and mental abilities." Id. Doe
brought suit against the university seeking a preliminary injunction on the basis that the
speech regulation would unduly chill protected speech. Id. at 861. The district court
concluded that the university's hate speech regulation was unconstitutionally overbroad and
vague. Id. at 866-67.
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speech based on its content" 8 and embodied an impermissibly vague rule.21 9
In UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin,' the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin considered
whether the University of Wisconsin hate speech code violated the Constitution." Because the speech code banned specific language without a requirement that the utterance of the words have a tendency to incite vio-

lence, the district court concluded that the regulated speech m did not fall
within the fighting words exception;'

thus, the court found that the regula-

More recently, in Dambrot v. Central Michigan
tion was overbroad.'
z
University, ' the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan determined that the speech code at issue was fatally overbroad.'
218. Id. at 866.
219. Id. at 867.
220. 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
221. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of the Univ.. of Wis., 774 F. Supp.
1163, 1164, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (finding that hate speech code was invalid). In UWM
Post, the district court considered whether the university's hate speech code chilled protected
speech. Id. at 1164, 1179. In response to several highly publicized racial incidents
involving fraternities, the university adopted a hostile speech code. Id. at 1165. The speech
code called for discipline of any student who participated in "racist or discriminatory
comments, epithets or other expressive behavior directed at an individual . . . or for

physical conduct, if such comments, epithets or other expressive behavior or physical
conduct intentionally: 1. Demean [the protected class status] of the individual . . . and 2.
[c]reate an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education." Id. (citing Wis.
ADMIN. CODE § 17.06(2) (1989)). The district court concluded that the university's rule
was overbroad and vague in that the rule was content based and that it restricted protected
speech. Id. at 1181. According to the district court, the university's interest in shielding
students from harmful psychological effects and injuries caused by offensive speech was
commendable, but such an interest did not constitute a compelling state interest. Id. at
1176-77.
222. See id. at 1167 (stating that University of Wisconsin found that student violated
hate speech code "by yelling obscene epithets loudly at a woman for approximately ten
minutes").
223. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that "fighting words" are subcategory of speech that do not possess any constitutional protection). The
C7apinsky Court defined fighting words as "words likely to cause an average addressee to
fight." Id. at 573.
224. UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1168-72.
225. 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
226. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 481-82 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (finding that hate speech code was fatally overbroad). In Dambrot, the district
court considered the constitutionality of Central Michigan University's hate speech code.
Id. at 478. The university claimed that the speech code addressed only fighting words, but
the district court rejected the university's claim. Id. at 482-83. The district court reasoned
that the code was overbroad because the language of the speech code included within
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These invalidations of university hate speech codes reflect the difficulty
of attempting to restrict the speech of a particular group of individuals,
even if the policy reasons appear to be persuasive. For the university that
wants to create a healthy environment through implementing speech codes,
the challenge is to draft a regulation that is neither overbroad nor vague
under the First Amendment.' Drafters of ethical rules face similar challenges because of the constant tension between ethical policy goals and
freedom of speech rights.' The district court in Yagman found Local Rule
2.5.2, which prohibits impugning the integrity of the court, to be
overbroad, but the court saved the rule by applying a libel-like reasonable
attorney standard. 9 The issue thus has become whether the Yagman court

misconstrued and misapplied the Sandlin test, thereby frustrating the Local
Rule's purpose of protecting the integrity of the court by shielding Yagman
as if he were an ordinary citizen, not a voluntary member of a regulated
profession.
3. Insight Provided by Hate Speech Code Jurisprudence
In the debate over attorney criticism of the judiciary, the potential
harms of permitting increased levels of criticism are more substantial than
the dangers present in the hate speech code debate. The consequences of
overturning a hate speech code arguably yield a more offensive, hostile
environment for students who are victims of harsh epithets. Although the
consequences of invalidating hate speech codes can result in mental injury
to the speaker's targets, the danger of inhibiting the free exchange of ideas
with a code that sweeps too broadly outweighs the risk of such injuries.

its scope "[alll possible human conduct." Id. at 481-82. In addition, the district court
determined that the university's hate speech policy was void for vagueness because it failed
to give fair notice and because it gave excessive discretion to the enforcement officers. Id.
at 484.
227. See Bussian, supra note 215, at 173-82 (describing constitutional boundaries for
speech codes and recommending better methods for drafting such codes).
228. See id. at 173-74 (discussing extent to which universities continue their efforts to
protect specific classes of individuals from harmful speech, often with codes that violate
First Amendment). Bussian states that "384 public universities have some type of speech
code. And according to well-established precedent, the majority of these codes violate the
First Amendment." Id. (footnotes omitted).
229. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 856 F. Supp. 1384, 1389-90 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (finding ethical rule overbroad, but applying limiting construction to save rule);
supra note 124 (summarizing Sandlin holding, including court's adoption of reasonable
attorney test).
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In the hate speech context, courts have found that the risks of punishing protected speech"0 and chilling academic debater' outweigh the benefits

of protecting specified groups from offensive and demeaning language 32
In contrast, protecting the administration of justice and upholding the
integrity of the legal system justify the reasonable restrictions imposed on
attorneys. Therefore, the appropriate constitutional response to the attorney

criticism debate should include the imposition of a defined set of restrictions
upon attorneys' First Amendment rights, while providing alternative channels for criticisms that are necessary to improve the quality of our legal
system.
VII

Conclusion

In reversing sanctions against Yagman, the Ninth Circuit departed from
attorney discipline precedent that has sanctioned attorneys for criticizing the
judiciary in a manner that damages the legal profession's reputation, taints
the judiciary's appearance of impartiality, or interferes with the administration of justice. 3 Although courts have consistently determined that the
policy interests supporting the restrictions warrant the limitation of rights,
the Ninth Circuit applied the First Amendment to shield Yagman from
sanctions as if he were not a member of a profession that bears special
230. See Dambrot, 839 F. Supp. at 481-82 (finding hate speech code fatally overbroad
because it swept protected speech within its prohibition); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (concluding that hate
speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted protected speech); Doe
v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding hate speech code
unconstitutionally overbroad both facially and as applied because it punished protected
speech).
231. See Page & Hunnicutt, supra note 208, at 13-14 (citing Kent Greenawalt, Free
Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130 (1989) (asserting that most typical
argument for freedom of speech is that speech promotes discovery of truth)); see also Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (declaring that neither students
nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate").
232. See Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 393 (4th
Cir. 1993) (upholding First Amendment rights notwithstanding potential harms to insulted
class of individuals); Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 482 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (finding that First Amendment protections prevailed even though speaker used racial
epithets); UWM Post, 774 F. Supp. at 1172-73 (concluding First Amendment interests
trumped efforts to suppress degrading epithets); Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866-67 (concluding
that First Amendment required striking hate speech code despite use of offensive, sexist
remarks).
233. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text (critiquing Ninth Circuit for its
departure from traditional attorney criticism precedent).
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obligations.' If other circuits follow the Ninth Circuit's treatment of the
attorney criticism issue, attorneys will have a powerful defense to ethical
restrictions on speech,' 5 and the legal profession's reputation and the

administration of justice may suffer accordingly.
The Hatch Act jurisprudence and hate speech jurisprudence provide6
useful guidance for the resolution of the attorney free speech controversy.1

The Hatch Act infringes on core political speech rights, and hate speech
codes prohibit speech that more closely resembles unprotected speech. 7
Yet, the Supreme Court upheld the Hatch Act," 8 whereas courts consistently have invalidated hate speech codes. 9 This anomaly is explained by

a valuation of the risks and the interests at stake. Hatch Act interests rest
at one end of the spectrum and hate speech code interests rest at the other

end - the former justifying speech restrictions and the latter not. The
policies justifying restrictions on attorney speech resemble the policies
underlying the Hatch Act more closely than they resemble the justifications

for hate speech codes. 2' At the same time, the risks of imposing restrictions on attorney speech are less substantial than the risks of allowing
federal employees to participate fully in partisan politics.241 The risk of
234. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's
utilization of standards governing ordinary citizen's First Amendment liberties to reverse
sanctions against member of legal profession).
235. See Reuben, supra note 9,at 23 (reporting that legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers
believes Ninth Circuit opinion provides attorneys with new First Amendment shield).
236. See supra Part VI (surveying Hatch Act and hate speech code jurisprudence in
order to extract guiding principles for solving attorney criticism controversy).
237. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973) (finding that obscenity
does not receive protection of First Amendment); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957) (concluding that obscenity was "outside the protection intended for speech").
238. See United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 556 (1973) (concluding that First Amendment restrictions on government employees
under Hatch Act survived constitutional scrutiny); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 103-04 (1947) (same).
239. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 481-82 (E.D. Mich.
1993) (finding hate speech code unconstitutionally overbroad); UWM Post, Inc. v. Board
of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-72 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (concluding
that hate speech code was unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted protected
speech); Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (finding
hate speech code unconstitutionally overbroad both facially and as applied because it punished protected speech).
240. See supra Part VI.A.2 (discussing extent to which attorney criticism interests and
risks parallel Hatch Act justifications).
241. See supra Part VI.A.2 (discussing how risks of limiting attorney speech are less
substantial than risks of limiting political speech under Hatch Act).
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harm from restricting attorney criticism is less substantial because attorneys
have alternative channels for presenting justified criticism.' 2 The risk of
harm to government employees is greater because the Hatch Act restrictions
eliminate certain First Amendment rights completely.1 3 Thus, courts
should consider ethical restrictions on attorney speech under the jurisprudence upholding the Hatch Act. Based on the policy interests at stake in
the context of attorney criticism of the judiciary, the Ninth Circuit should
have remained faithful to traditional policy considerations and affirmed the
imposition of sanctions against Yagman.
Opponents of ethical restrictions on attorney speech assert that there
is no need for the restrictions because a judge can bring a defamation
lawsuit that would fully protect the interests at stake.'
This assertion
entirely misses the point of the ethical restrictions. Ethical rules that
restrict attorney criticism do not stem from a desire to shelter judges from
the harms of personal insult. Rather, the purposes of attorney criticism
restrictions include: (1) securing noninterference with the administration of
justice, (2) safeguarding the appearance of judicial impartiality, and
(3) upholding the reputation of the law and the legal profession. u 5 Therefore, sufficient grounds exist for having a system that provides attorneys
fewer First Amendment protections, and such restrictions should survive
constitutional scrutiny as the Hatch Act restrictions have survived.

242. See United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1995) (determining that
rule on impugning integrity ofjudge did not apply to lawyer's in-court comments concerning
judge's actual performance during trial and appearance of partiality).
243. See supra Part VI.A.2 (explaining greater severity of Hatch Act consequences
compared to minimal intrusion on attorneys' First Amendment rights).
244. See Amici Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress-Pacific Southwest
Region, Article 19, and Individual Law Professors and Attorneys in Support of RespondentAppellant at 3, Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)
(No. 94-55918) (suggesting that ethical restrictions on attorney speech are unnecessary
because judges have complete access to defamation lawsuits to vindicate wrongs).
245. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text (describing policy interests supporting restrictions of attorney criticism of judiciary).
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